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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-27695: zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

mediumCVSS 3.1 4.3GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6

Summary All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Published Feb 25, 2026

Affected packages

zae-limiter

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 0.10.0
Fixed in
0.10.1
Check
pip show zae-limiter

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Details

Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.

The library has no built-in mitigation:

  • No partition key sharding/salting
  • No write coalescing or batching
  • No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
  • RateLimiterUnavailable is raised but the caller has already been delayed

Impact

  • Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
  • Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
  • Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others

Reproduction

  1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
  2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
  3. Observe DynamoDB ThrottledRequests CloudWatch metric increasing
  4. Observe acquire() latency spikes and RateLimiterUnavailable exceptions

Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets

  • Move buckets to PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE — one partition per (entity, resource, shard)
  • Auto-inject wcu:1000 reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)
  • Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on wcu exhaustion or proactively by aggregator
  • Shard 0 at suffix #0 is source of truth for shard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shards
  • Original limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived: original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not divided
  • Shard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
  • Lazy shard creation on first access
  • Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
  • Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own wcu
  • Aggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter wcu from snapshots
  • Clean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
  • $0.625/M preserved on hot path

Credited to sodre.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology