CVE-2026-28477: OpenClaw Chutes manual OAuth state validation bypass can cause credential substitution
OpenClaw's manual Chutes OAuth login accepted a pasted bare authorization code and skipped the OAuth `state` check. A user tricked into pasting attacker-supplied callback data would have OpenClaw store tokens for the attacker's Chutes account. Versions below 2026.2.14 are affected. Fixed in 2026.2.14.
Published Feb 18, 2026 · Updated Mar 6, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026
What an attacker can do
In the manual flow, OpenClaw asks the user to paste the redirect result. parseOAuthCallbackInput in src/agents/chutes-oauth.ts accepted a bare code and assumed the expected state matched, so the CSRF protection that state provides never ran.
The attack is a login-CSRF credential swap. The attacker starts their own Chutes authorization, gets a valid code for their account, and persuades the victim to paste it at the OpenClaw prompt. OpenClaw exchanges the code and saves tokens for the wrong account. Later requests that OpenClaw sends to Chutes, such as prompts and model traffic, then go through an account the attacker controls and can read.
It needs user interaction and a convincing lure (CVSS 3.1 rating of 5.9, high attack complexity). The automatic local callback flow is not affected, because the local HTTP handler validates state. Only people who choose manual login are exposed.
Who is affected
The openclaw npm package below 2026.2.14, and only if you sign in to Chutes through the manual OAuth prompt that asks you to paste the callback. The automatic local-callback flow is not affected. Check the version:
openclaw --versionopenclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2026.2.14
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.14
- Check
npm ls openclaw
How to fix it
Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.14 or later.
npm install -g [email protected]The manual flow now asks for the full redirect URL, which must include code and state. A bare query string such as code=...&state=... also works. A state that does not match the expected value is rejected with "OAuth state mismatch - possible CSRF attack. Please retry login." A bare code is refused. If you logged in manually on an older version and pasted data you did not generate yourself, sign out and log in again, and check the Chutes account that OpenClaw is linked to.
How to tell if you were hit
Check which Chutes account OpenClaw is authenticated as and compare it with your own. Review the stored Chutes credentials in the OpenClaw auth profiles for tokens you do not recognize, and the Chutes account activity page for usage you did not make. Ask whether anyone sent you a code or link to paste during a manual login.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The manual Chutes OAuth login flow could accept attacker-controlled callback input in a way that bypassed OAuth CSRF state validation, potentially resulting in credential substitution.
Impact
If an attacker can convince a user to paste attacker-provided OAuth callback data during the manual login prompt, OpenClaw may exchange an attacker-obtained authorization code and persist tokens for the wrong Chutes account.
The automatic local callback flow is not affected (it validates state in the local HTTP callback handler).
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm):<= 2026.2.13when using the manual Chutes OAuth login flow.
Fix
The manual flow now requires the full redirect URL (must include code and state), validates the returned state against the expected value, and rejects code-only pastes.
Fix Commit(s)
- a99ad11a4107ba8eac58f54a3c1a8a0cf5686f47
Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
Questions
- Does the automatic Chutes login have this problem?
No. The advisory says the local callback flow validates state in its HTTP handler. Only the manual paste flow was affected.
- What does the patched prompt accept?
The full redirect URL with both
codeandstate, or a query string with both. A bare code is rejected.- What can the attacker gain?
OpenClaw ends up signed in to the attacker's Chutes account, so traffic and usage sent through it is visible to them.
- Is CVE-2026-28477 exploited in the wild?
No source says so, and it is not in CISA's KEV catalog.
References
Read for this analysis:
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-7rcp-mxpq-72pj
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28477
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-oauth-state-validation-bypass-in-manual-chutes-login-flow
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7rcp-mxpq-72pj
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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