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AI agent vulnerability · OpenClaw

CVE-2026-28481: OpenClaw MS Teams inbound attachment downloader leaks bearer tokens to allowlisted suffix domains

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.9 · 3.1 7.4GHSA-7vwx-582j-j332

OpenClaw's optional MS Teams extension retries attachment and inline-image downloads with an `Authorization: Bearer` header after a 401 or 403. Because the default download allowlist uses suffix matching, including some multi-tenant suffix domains, a Teams message that points at an untrusted but allowlisted host can make OpenClaw send its bearer token there. Upgrade to 2026.2.1.

Published Feb 17, 2026 · Updated Mar 6, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026

What an attacker can do

When the downloader fetches an inbound Teams attachment and the server answers 401 or 403, it repeats the request with a bearer token. The check for whether a host may receive that token relied on the default allowlist, which matches by domain suffix. Some suffixes in that list are multi-tenant, meaning many unrelated parties can run hosts under them.

An attacker who can send a message into a Teams conversation the bot reads can reference an attachment on a host they control under such a suffix. The host replies 401, OpenClaw retries with its token, and the attacker receives it (CWE-201). The CVSS vector marks this as network-reachable, with user action present, and a high confidentiality impact.

The token is one OpenClaw uses toward Microsoft services for the Teams channel, so a thief can act with the bot's access. Only deployments that enable the optional MS Teams extension are affected. The advisory names no further impact beyond the token leak.

Who is affected

The openclaw npm package. The advisory text says <= 2026.1.30; the package data lists everything below 2026.2.1. Only installs with the MS Teams extension (Teams channel) enabled are exposed. Check:

npm ls openclaw

Then look at the Teams extension's download or auth host allowlist in your config for wildcard or broad suffix entries.

openclaw

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 2026.2.1
Fixed in
2026.2.1
Check
npm ls openclaw

How to fix it

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.1 or later:

npm install -g [email protected]

The fix is commit 41cc5bcd. Workarounds from the advisory: disable the MS Teams extension if you do not need it. If you must stay on an older version, keep the auth host allowlist strict, with only Microsoft-owned endpoints that require auth, and avoid wildcard or broad suffix entries. Consider rotating the Teams bot credentials if you suspect a token was sent out.

How to tell if you were hit

Check egress and proxy logs for requests from the OpenClaw host to hosts under allowlisted multi-tenant suffixes that are not Microsoft's, followed by a retry carrying an Authorization header. Review Teams messages with attachment or inline-image links that point at unfamiliar hosts. Look in Azure sign-in and audit logs for use of the bot's token from addresses that are not yours.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

NOTE: This only affects deployments that enable the optional MS Teams extension (Teams channel). If you do not use MS Teams, you are not impacted.

When OpenClaw downloads inbound MS Teams attachments / inline images, it may retry a URL with an Authorization: Bearer <token> header after receiving 401 or 403.

Because the default download allowlist uses suffix matching (and includes some multi-tenant suffix domains), a message that references an untrusted but allowlisted host could cause that bearer token to be sent to the wrong place.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Vulnerable: <= 2026.1.30
  • Patched: >= 2026.2.1

Fix

  • Fix commit: 41cc5bcd4f1d434ad1bbdfa55b56f25025ecbf6b
  • Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.1

Workarounds

  • If you do not need MS Teams, disable the MS Teams extension.
  • If you must stay on an older version, ensure the auth host allowlist is strict (only Microsoft-owned endpoints that require auth) and avoid wildcard or broad suffix entries.

Credits

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.

Credited to yueyueL.

Questions

Am I affected if I do not use Microsoft Teams?

No. The advisory says only deployments that enable the optional MS Teams extension are affected.

What does the attacker need to do?

Get a message in front of the Teams channel that links an attachment on a host they control, under a suffix that the default allowlist accepts. User action is marked as present in the CVSS 4.0 vector.

Can I fix it without upgrading?

Partly. The advisory says to disable the extension, or to restrict the auth host allowlist to Microsoft-owned endpoints and avoid broad suffix entries. Upgrading to 2026.2.1 is the fix.

Is it exploited in the wild?

No source reports exploitation, and it is not in CISA's KEV catalog.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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