CVE-2026-28699: Gitea: OAuth2 access token scope enforcement bypass via HTTP Basic authentication
Summary Gitea fails to enforce OAuth2 access token scopes when the token is submitted via HTTP Basic authentication instead of a Bearer token. An OAuth2 application granted only read:user can use the same token as Authorization: Basic base64( :x-oauth-basic) and perform write actions, including modifying profiles, adding email addresses, creating repositories, and deleting repositories as the authorizing user.
Published Jun 16, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.26.1
- Fixed in
- 1.26.2
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Gitea fails to enforce OAuth2 access token scopes when the token is submitted via HTTP Basic authentication instead of a Bearer token. An OAuth2 application granted only read:user can use the same token as Authorization: Basic base64(<token>:x-oauth-basic) and perform write actions, including modifying profiles, adding email addresses, creating repositories, and deleting repositories as the authorizing user.
Details
Root cause: services/auth/basic.go accepts OAuth2 access tokens through the Basic auth path but does not store the token scope in the request context:
// services/auth/basic.go
if uid != 0 {
store.GetData()["LoginMethod"] = OAuth2TokenMethodName
store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true // scope is NOT set
return u, nil
}The scope enforcement middleware in routers/api/v1/api.go exits early when ApiTokenScope is absent:
// routers/api/v1/api.go — tokenRequiresScopes
scope, scopeExists := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
if ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true || !scopeExists {
return //<- exits without checking scope, all actions permitted
}When a token arrives via Bearer, ApiTokenScope is populated and scope checks apply normally. When the same token arrives via Basic auth, ApiTokenScope is never set, so tokenRequiresScopes returns immediately and no scope is enforced.
Suggested fix: When an OAuth2 access token is accepted in services/auth/basic.go, populate ApiTokenScope in the request context identically to the Bearer-token OAuth2 path.
PoC
- Create an OAuth2 application in Gitea.
- Authorize it as a normal user with scope
read:useronly. - Take the resulting access token and call a write endpoint both ways:
Bearer | correctly blocked:
Authorization: Bearer <token>
PATCH /api/v1/user/settings -> 403 ForbiddenBasic | bypass:
Authorization: Basic base64(<token>:x-oauth-basic)
PATCH /api/v1/user/settings -> 200 OKAll verified bypass endpoints using a `read:user`-only token:
| Endpoint | Bearer | Basic |
| `PATCH /api/v1/user/settings` | 403 | 200 |
| `POST /api/v1/user/emails` | 403 | 200 |
| `POST /api/v1/user/repos` | 403 | 200 |
| `PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}` | 403 | 200 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}` | 403 | 200 |The bypass respects the user's normal repository permissions, it does not grant access to repositories the user cannot otherwise reach, and does not escalate to admin.
Impact
Any OAuth2 application with any restricted scope can silently operate beyond its granted permissions by switching from Bearer to Basic auth. An attacker who obtains a token (e.g. via a malicious OAuth2 app a user authorized) can:
- Modify the victim's profile and settings
- Add attacker-controlled email addresses to the victim's account
- Create repositories as the victim
- Modify or delete the victim's private repositories
The entire OAuth2 scope system is effectively bypassed for any token submitted via Basic auth.
Credited to Alardiians.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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