CVE-2026-29612: OpenClaw: denial of service through large base64 media files allocating large buffers before limit checks
OpenClaw decoded base64 media and chat attachments into memory before checking their size. A caller who sends oversized base64 can force large allocations and exhaust memory. `openclaw` below 2026.2.14 is affected and fixed in 2026.2.14; `clawdbot` up to 2026.1.24-3 has no patched release.
Published Feb 18, 2026 · Updated Mar 6, 2026 · Analysis Nov 1, 2026
What an attacker can do
In src/gateway/chat-attachments.ts, parseMessageWithAttachments() and buildMessageWithAttachments() called Buffer.from(b64, "base64") to find out how big an attachment was, then compared that with the limit. The oversize check therefore ran after the allocation. A very large base64 string caused a very large buffer first, and the request was rejected only afterwards, if the process survived. The input-file media path had a similar estimator that copied the string with trim() and replace().
The advisory ties severity to exposure. With the recommended setup, a loopback-bound gateway with auth required, this is a local or authorized DoS (3.1 score 5.5). If the gateway is exposed to untrusted networks, or auth and rate limits are weakened, it becomes a higher-risk network DoS.
The result is memory pressure and a crash or stall of the Node.js process, which takes down every agent session on that gateway. There is no data exposure or code execution.
Who is affected
openclaw(npm): below 2026.2.14.clawdbot(npm): up to and including 2026.1.24-3. No patched release is planned.
Risk is highest where the gateway is reachable by people you do not trust, or its auth is weak. Check what is installed:
npm ls -g openclaw clawdbotopenclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2026.2.14
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.14
- Check
npm ls openclaw
clawdbot
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2026.1.24-3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
npm ls clawdbot
How to fix it
Upgrade openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later.
npm install -g [email protected]The fix adds estimateBase64DecodedBytes() in src/media/base64.ts, which computes the decoded size from the string length and padding without making a copy, and a base64 validity check. Oversized or empty attachments are rejected before any decode. For clawdbot, the advisory says no patched release is planned; migrate to openclaw. Until you upgrade, keep the gateway bound to loopback with auth required.
How to tell if you were hit
Look for gateway restarts, out-of-memory kills or sharp heap growth that line up with chat attachment or media-input requests. Check access logs for unusually large request bodies to the gateway HTTP endpoints, and for the client that sent them. Review who can reach the gateway port and whether auth is enforced.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Base64-backed media inputs could be decoded into Buffers before enforcing decoded-size budgets. An attacker supplying oversized base64 payloads can force large allocations, causing memory pressure and denial of service.
Attack Scenario Notes
- Recommended deployments bind the gateway to loopback by default and require gateway auth for HTTP endpoints. In that configuration, this is best modeled as a local/authorized DoS.
- If an operator exposes the gateway to untrusted networks (or disables/weakens auth and rate limits), treat this as a higher-severity network DoS risk.
Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.13
- clawdbot (npm): <= 2026.1.24-3
Fixed In
- openclaw (npm): 2026.2.14 (planned)
- clawdbot (npm): no patched release planned; migrate to openclaw
Fix Commit(s)
- 31791233d60495725fa012745dde8d6ee69e9595
Credits
Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.
Credited to vincentkoc.
Questions
- Is clawdbot patched for CVE-2026-29612?
No. The advisory states there is no patched release planned for
clawdbotand tells users to migrate toopenclaw.- Can this be exploited remotely?
Only if the gateway is exposed to untrusted networks or auth is weakened. With the default loopback bind and required auth, it is best treated as a local or authorized DoS.
- What is the root cause?
The size limit was checked after decoding base64 into a Buffer. The fix estimates the decoded size from the string length first.
- Is it exploited in the wild?
No source says so, and it is not in CISA's KEV catalog.
References
Read for this analysis:
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w2cg-vxx6-5xjg
- https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29612
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-denial-of-service-via-large-base-media-file-decoding
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w2cg-vxx6-5xjg
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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