CVE-2026-30886: New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check
Summary The video proxy endpoint GET /v1/videos/:taskid/content is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's taskid can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by taskid alone and does not verify ownership.
Published Mar 23, 2026 · Updated Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.11.4-alpha.2
- Fixed in
- 0.11.4-alpha.2
- Check
go list -m github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The video proxy endpoint GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's task_id can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by task_id alone and does not verify ownership.
Affected Component
- Endpoint:
GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content - Route middleware:
TokenOrUserAuth() - Vulnerable handler:
controller.VideoProxy
Details
VideoProxy fetches the task with:
task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID)GetByOnlyTaskId performs a database lookup using only task_id:
err = DB.Where("task_id = ?", taskId).First(&task).ErrorThe authenticated user's ID is available in request context, but VideoProxy does not use it. This allows any authenticated user to request /v1/videos/<foreign_task_id>/content and access another user's video if they know a valid task ID.
Other task-fetch paths already enforce ownership correctly via:
model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskId)Impact
An authenticated attacker who knows another user's task_id can:
- Download video content belonging to another user
- Bypass tenant isolation for generated media assets
- Cause the server to fetch upstream video content for a task the attacker does not own
For Gemini tasks, the proxy also uses task.PrivateData.Key when contacting the upstream provider. In addition, full upstream response headers are forwarded back to the requester.
Proof of Concept
curl -o stolen_video.mp4 \
"https://<instance>/v1/videos/<victim_task_id>/content" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<attacker_token>"Expected result:
- Response returns
200 OK - Response body contains the victim's video content
Recommended Fix
Replace the task lookup in VideoProxy with an ownership-checked query:
userId := c.GetInt("id")
task, exists, err := model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID)Credited to Mistz1, Calcium-Ion.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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