CVE-2026-30920: OneUptime has broken access control in GitHub App installation flow that allows unauthorized project binding
Summary OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installationid values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding.
Published Mar 9, 2026 · Updated Mar 10, 2026
Affected packages
@oneuptime/common
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.0.19
- Fixed in
- 10.0.19
- Check
npm ls @oneuptime/common
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installation_id values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding.
Related GitHub endpoints also lack effective authorization, so a valid installation ID can be used to enumerate repositories and create CodeRepository records in an arbitrary project.
Details
The callback decodes unsigned base64 JSON from state and uses the embedded projectId directly:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112
It then writes the supplied installation_id into the target project with root privileges:
await ProjectService.updateOneById({
id: new ObjectID(projectId),
data: { gitHubAppInstallationId: installationId },
props: { isRoot: true },
});The userId in state is only checked for presence, not authenticity:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79
The install flow also generates state as plain base64 JSON, not a signed or session-bound token:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165
The follow-on endpoints are also vulnerable:
- Repository listing: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258
- Repository connect: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356
- Middleware allows requests with no token to continue as
Public: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211 - Installation tokens are minted from any valid installation ID: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425
PoC
Minimal proof of unauthorized project tampering:
STATE=$(printf '%s' '{"projectId":"<victim-project-uuid>","userId":"x"}' | base64 | tr -d '\n')
curl -isk "https://<host>/api/github/auth/callback?installation_id=999999999&state=${STATE}"Expected result:
- Server returns a
302redirect to/dashboard/<victim-project-uuid>/code-repository?installation_id=999999999 - The target project's
gitHubAppInstallationIdis overwritten
Impact
- Unauthorized modification of
Project.gitHubAppInstallationId - Temporary GitHub integration breakage if a bogus installation ID is set
- Cross-project binding of attacker-controlled GitHub App installations
- Repository metadata disclosure for a supplied valid installation ID
- Unauthorized creation of
CodeRepositoryrecords in arbitrary projects
Credited to maru1009.
References
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-656w-6f6c-m9r6
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30920
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-656w-6f6c-m9r6
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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