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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-30920: OneUptime has broken access control in GitHub App installation flow that allows unauthorized project binding

highCVSS 3.1 8.6GHSA-656w-6f6c-m9r6

Summary OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installationid values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding.

Published Mar 9, 2026 · Updated Mar 10, 2026

Affected packages

@oneuptime/common

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
< 10.0.19
Fixed in
10.0.19
Check
npm ls @oneuptime/common

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installation_id values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding.

Related GitHub endpoints also lack effective authorization, so a valid installation ID can be used to enumerate repositories and create CodeRepository records in an arbitrary project.

Details

The callback decodes unsigned base64 JSON from state and uses the embedded projectId directly:

  • https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112

It then writes the supplied installation_id into the target project with root privileges:

await ProjectService.updateOneById({
  id: new ObjectID(projectId),
  data: { gitHubAppInstallationId: installationId },
  props: { isRoot: true },
});

The userId in state is only checked for presence, not authenticity:

  • https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79

The install flow also generates state as plain base64 JSON, not a signed or session-bound token:

  • https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165

The follow-on endpoints are also vulnerable:

  • Repository listing: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258
  • Repository connect: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356
  • Middleware allows requests with no token to continue as Public: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211
  • Installation tokens are minted from any valid installation ID: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425

PoC

Minimal proof of unauthorized project tampering:

STATE=$(printf '%s' '{"projectId":"<victim-project-uuid>","userId":"x"}' | base64 | tr -d '\n')
curl -isk "https://<host>/api/github/auth/callback?installation_id=999999999&state=${STATE}"

Expected result:

  • Server returns a 302 redirect to /dashboard/<victim-project-uuid>/code-repository?installation_id=999999999
  • The target project's gitHubAppInstallationId is overwritten

Impact

  • Unauthorized modification of Project.gitHubAppInstallationId
  • Temporary GitHub integration breakage if a bogus installation ID is set
  • Cross-project binding of attacker-controlled GitHub App installations
  • Repository metadata disclosure for a supplied valid installation ID
  • Unauthorized creation of CodeRepository records in arbitrary projects

Credited to maru1009.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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