CVE-2026-32597: PyJWT accepts unknown `crit` header extensions
Summary PyJWT does not validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 §4.1.11. When a JWS token contains a crit array listing extensions that PyJWT does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the MUST requirement in the RFC. This is the same class of vulnerability as CVE-2025-59420 (Authlib), which received CVSS 7.5 (HIGH).
Published Mar 13, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
PyJWT
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.11.0
- Fixed in
- 2.12.0
- Check
pip show PyJWT
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
PyJWT does not validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 §4.1.11. When a JWS token contains a crit array listing extensions that PyJWT does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the MUST requirement in the RFC.
This is the same class of vulnerability as CVE-2025-59420 (Authlib), which received CVSS 7.5 (HIGH).
---
RFC Requirement
RFC 7515 §4.1.11:
The "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter indicates that extensions to this > specification and/or [JWA] are being used that MUST be understood and > processed. [...] If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are > not understood and supported by the recipient, then the JWS is invalid.
---
Proof of Concept
import jwt # PyJWT 2.8.0
import hmac, hashlib, base64, json
# Construct token with unknown critical extension
header = {"alg": "HS256", "crit": ["x-custom-policy"], "x-custom-policy": "require-mfa"}
payload = {"sub": "attacker", "role": "admin"}
def b64url(data):
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode()
h = b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
p = b64url(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
sig = b64url(hmac.new(b"secret", f"{h}.{p}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
token = f"{h}.{p}.{sig}"
# Should REJECT — x-custom-policy is not understood by PyJWT
try:
result = jwt.decode(token, "secret", algorithms=["HS256"])
print(f"ACCEPTED: {result}")
# Output: ACCEPTED: {'sub': 'attacker', 'role': 'admin'}
except Exception as e:
print(f"REJECTED: {e}")Expected: jwt.exceptions.InvalidTokenError: Unsupported critical extension: x-custom-policy Actual: Token accepted, payload returned.
Comparison with RFC-compliant library
# jwcrypto — correctly rejects
from jwcrypto import jwt as jw_jwt, jwk
key = jwk.JWK(kty="oct", k=b64url(b"secret"))
jw_jwt.JWT(jwt=token, key=key, algs=["HS256"])
# raises: InvalidJWSObject('Unknown critical header: "x-custom-policy"')---
Impact
- Split-brain verification in mixed-library deployments (e.g., API gateway using jwcrypto rejects, backend using PyJWT accepts)
- Security policy bypass when
critcarries enforcement semantics (MFA, token binding, scope restrictions) - Token binding bypass — RFC 7800
cnf(Proof-of-Possession) can be silently ignored - See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis
---
Suggested Fix
In jwt/api_jwt.py, add validation in _validate_headers() or decode():
_SUPPORTED_CRIT = {"b64"} # Add extensions PyJWT actually supports
def _validate_crit(self, headers: dict) -> None:
crit = headers.get("crit")
if crit is None:
return
if not isinstance(crit, list) or len(crit) == 0:
raise InvalidTokenError("crit must be a non-empty array")
for ext in crit:
if ext not in self._SUPPORTED_CRIT:
raise InvalidTokenError(f"Unsupported critical extension: {ext}")
if ext not in headers:
raise InvalidTokenError(f"Critical extension {ext} not in header")---
CWE
- CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
- CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
References
Credited to dmbs335.
References
- https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-752w-5fwx-jx9f
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32597
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/05/msg00008.html
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyjwt/PYSEC-2026-120.yaml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-752w-5fwx-jx9f
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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