CVE-2026-32762: Rack: Forwarded Header semicolon injection enables Host and Scheme spoofing
Summary Rack::Utils.forwardedvalues parses the RFC 7239 Forwarded header by splitting on semicolons before handling quoted-string values. Because quoted values may legally contain semicolons, a header such as: can be interpreted by Rack as multiple Forwarded directives rather than as a single quoted for value.
Published Apr 2, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21
- Fixed in
- 3.1.21
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6
- Fixed in
- 3.2.6
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::Utils.forwarded_values parses the RFC 7239 Forwarded header by splitting on semicolons before handling quoted-string values. Because quoted values may legally contain semicolons, a header such as:
Forwarded: for="127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https"can be interpreted by Rack as multiple Forwarded directives rather than as a single quoted for value.
In deployments where an upstream proxy, WAF, or intermediary validates or preserves quoted Forwarded values differently, this discrepancy can allow an attacker to smuggle host, proto, for, or by parameters through a single header value.
Details
Rack::Utils.forwarded_values processes the header using logic equivalent to:
forwarded_header.split(';').each_with_object({}) do |field, values|
field.split(',').each do |pair|
pair = pair.split('=').map(&:strip).join('=')
return nil unless pair =~ /\A(by|for|host|proto)="?([^"]+)"?\Z/i
(values[$1.downcase.to_sym] ||= []) << $2
end
endThe method splits on ; before it parses individual name=value pairs. This is inconsistent with RFC 7239, which permits quoted-string values, and quoted strings may contain semicolons as literal content.
As a result, a header value such as:
Forwarded: for="127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https"is not treated as a single for value. Instead, Rack may interpret it as if the client had supplied separate for, host, and proto directives.
This creates an interpretation conflict when another component in front of Rack treats the quoted value as valid literal content, while Rack reparses it as multiple forwarding parameters.
Impact
Applications that rely on Forwarded to derive request metadata may observe attacker-controlled values for host, proto, for, or related URL components.
In affected deployments, this can lead to host or scheme spoofing in derived values such as req.host, req.scheme, req.base_url, or req.url. Applications that use those values for password reset links, redirects, absolute URL generation, logging, IP-based decisions, or backend requests may be vulnerable to downstream security impact.
The practical security impact depends on deployment architecture. If clients can already supply arbitrary trusted Forwarded parameters directly, this bug may not add meaningful attacker capability. The issue is most relevant where an upstream component and Rack interpret the same Forwarded header differently.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack that parses
Forwardedquoted-string values before splitting on parameter delimiters. - Avoid trusting client-supplied
Forwardedheaders unless they are normalized or regenerated by a trusted reverse proxy. - Prefer stripping inbound
Forwardedheaders at the edge and reconstructing them from trusted proxy metadata. - Avoid using
req.host,req.scheme,req.base_url, orreq.urlfor security-sensitive operations unless the forwarding chain is explicitly trusted and validated.
Credited to th4s1s, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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