CVE-2026-33045: Home Assistant has stored XSS in history-graphs
Summary The "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable to the same issue as CVE-2025-62172. This also indicates that any sensor showing their name in the history-graph, is likely to be vulnerable to this issue.
Published Mar 27, 2026
Affected packages
homeassistant
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 2025.02, < 2026.01
- Fixed in
- 2026.01
- Check
pip show homeassistant
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable to the same issue as CVE-2025-62172.
This also indicates that any sensor showing their name in the history-graph, is likely to be vulnerable to this issue.
Details
Another entity was found which displays the same behavior as in this issue: CVE-2025-62172
The History-graph card will sometimes display the name of the entity it is displaying, when the graph is shown as a line with values on the x and y axis. This appears to be vulnerable to Cross-Site scripting (_XSS_) as it does not have any output escaping or sanitization.
The PoC in this instance only shows HTML-injection in the form of the <s> -tag being rendered as strike through, but the vulnerability also allows for injecting arbitrary tags which execute JavaScript, like the example given in the PoC description below.
PoC
- Register a new sensor (or device) or change the name of an existing one, which provides a location
- Change the name to something malicious, for example
testFor a new entity, it should work when setting the name. For old entities, go here:
PS: the example pictures show changing the name of the device-tracker entity, which is wrong. Just change the name of the `remaining charge time`-sensor in order to validate this finding
- Add a history graph card with the malicious sensor
- Hover the graph for payload execution
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability is that a user can target other users of the system and perform account takeover through client side exploitation of XSS.
In the context of this system, I believe the vulnerability to be less impactful than the CVSS metric describes. It is not displayed anywhere by default, it is not natural to display this history graph, and it also has no potential for being imported through seemingly innocent integrations. It also appears to rely on having used/using Android Auto. Other devices which has the same sensor can trigger the same vulnerability, and I expect there to exists cloud-based devices that would enable a threat actor to deliver the payload remotely.
Credit: Robin Lunde - https://robinlunde.com
Credited to pwnpanda.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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