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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-33228: Prototype Pollution via parse() in NodeJS flatted

highCVSS 4.0 8.9GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh

--- Summary The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "\\proto\\" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter.

Published Mar 19, 2026 · Updated Oct 5, 2026

Affected packages

flatted

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 3.4.1
Fixed in
3.4.2
Check
npm ls flatted

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

--- Summary

The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "\_\_proto\_\_" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype.

--- Root Cause

File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js)

  const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => {
    for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) {
      const k = ke[y];
      const value = output[k];    
      if (value instanceof Primitive) {
        const tmp = input[value];      // Bug is here

No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "\_\_proto\_\_" resolves to Array.prototype, which:

  • has type "object" → passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30
  • is not in the parsed Set yet → passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard.
  • The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object. --- Replication Steps
  const Flatted = require('flatted'); 
  const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]');
  parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned';
  console.log([].polluted);  // Returns true

--- Impact An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution.

Recommended solution Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it:

// Before (vulnerable) const tmp = input[value];

// After (safe) const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String → number const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length) ? input[idx] : undefined;

Credited to yohannslm.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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