CVE-2026-33312: Vikunja read-only users can delete project background images via broken object-level authorization
Summary The DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/background endpoint checks CanRead permission instead of CanUpdate, allowing any user with read-only access to a project to permanently delete its background image. Details The RemoveProjectBackground handler (pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go) reuses checkProjectBackgroundRights, a helper originally written for the read-only GetProjectBackground endpoint.
Published Mar 20, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.20.2, < 2.2.0
- Fixed in
- 2.2.0
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/background endpoint checks CanRead permission instead of CanUpdate, allowing any user with read-only access to a project to permanently delete its background image.
Details
The RemoveProjectBackground handler (pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go) reuses checkProjectBackgroundRights, a helper originally written for the read-only GetProjectBackground endpoint. This helper only verifies CanRead permission. In contrast, the handler for *setting* a background (setBackgroundPreparations) correctly checks CanUpdate.
As a result, destructive write operations (deleting the background file from storage and clearing the project's background_file_id and background_blur_hash fields) are gated behind a read-only permission check.
Impact
A user with read-only access to a project — via direct sharing, team membership, link share tokens with read permission, or read-scoped API tokens — can permanently delete the project's background image. The background file is removed from storage and cannot be recovered. This constitutes unauthorized data destruction.
Reproduction
- User A creates a project and sets a background image.
- User A shares the project with User B with read-only permission.
- User B sends:
DELETE /api/v1/projects/{project_id}/backgroundwith a valid auth token. - The request succeeds. The background image is permanently deleted.
References
pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go—RemoveProjectBackground(line 416),checkProjectBackgroundRights(line 304),setBackgroundPreparations(line 106)pkg/routes/routes.goline 665 — route registration
Credits
This vulnerability was found using GitHub Security Lab Taskflows.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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