CVE-2026-33313: Vikunja has an IDOR in Task Comments Allows Reading Arbitrary Comments
An authenticated user can read any task comment by ID, regardless of whether they have access to the task the comment belongs to, by substituting the task ID in the API URL with a task they do have access to. Details The GET /api/v1/tasks/{taskID}/comments/{commentID} endpoint performs an authorization check against the task ID provided in the URL path, then loads the comment by its own ID without verifying it…
Published Mar 20, 2026 · Updated Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.1.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
An authenticated user can read any task comment by ID, regardless of whether they have access to the task the comment belongs to, by substituting the task ID in the API URL with a task they do have access to.
Details
The GET /api/v1/tasks/{taskID}/comments/{commentID} endpoint performs an authorization check against the task ID provided in the URL path, then loads the comment by its own ID without verifying it belongs to that task.
Root Cause
In pkg/models/task_comment_permissions.go, CanRead constructs a Task using the TaskID from the URL and checks Task.CanRead:
func (tc *TaskComment) CanRead(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, int, error) {
t := Task{ID: tc.TaskID}
return t.CanRead(s, a)
}In pkg/models/task_comments.go, getTaskCommentSimple loads the comment by ID only, with NoAutoCondition() explicitly disabling XORM's implicit struct-field filtering:
func getTaskCommentSimple(s *xorm.Session, tc *TaskComment) error {
exists, err := s.
Where("id = ?", tc.ID).
NoAutoCondition().
Get(tc)
// ...
}The generic web handler (pkg/web/handler/read_one.go) calls CanRead before ReadOne, so the permission check passes against the attacker-controlled task ID, and then ReadOne returns the comment from a completely different task.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker is authenticated and has read access to any task (task ID
A) — e.g. their own task. - Attacker guesses or enumerates a comment ID (
C) belonging to a task in another user's private project. - Attacker requests:
GET /api/v1/tasks/A/comments/C - Authorization passes because the attacker can read task
A. - The comment
Cis loaded by ID only and returned, leaking its contents and author.
Credit
This vulnerability was found using GitHub Security Lab Taskflows.
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/bc6d843ed4df82a6c89f10aa676a7a33d27bf2fd
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33313
- https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-57458
Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth session credentials
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-62367
Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover
high7.5Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-62376
Vikunja: Plaintext storage of password-reset/email-confirm tokens in database enables account takeover on DB read access
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-68581
Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-68582
Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)
critical9.3Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-76216
Vikunja: Link-share principal-type confusion enables cross-account team removal, bot takeover, and roster disclosure
high7.5Oct 9, 2026
