CVE-2026-33700: Vikunja has a Link Share Delete IDOR — Missing Project Ownership Check Allows Cross-Project Link Share Deletion
Summary The DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/shares/:share endpoint does not verify that the link share belongs to the project specified in the URL. An attacker with admin access to any project can delete link shares from other projects by providing their own project ID combined with the target share ID.
Published Mar 25, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.2.1
- Fixed in
- 2.2.1
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/shares/:share endpoint does not verify that the link share belongs to the project specified in the URL. An attacker with admin access to any project can delete link shares from other projects by providing their own project ID combined with the target share ID.
Details
The permission check in canDoLinkShare (pkg/models/link_sharing_permissions.go:53-70) validates admin access on the project from the :project URL parameter. However, the Delete method at pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305 queries only WHERE id = ? using the share ID, without verifying it belongs to the URL-specified project:
func (share *LinkSharing) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
_, err = s.Where("id = ?", share.ID).Delete(share)
return
}This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 (task attachment IDOR) and the fixed GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4 (task comment IDOR).
Additionally, ReadOne at line 203 has the same pattern (WHERE id = ? only), though it is not currently exploitable because CanRead fails first due to an unrelated issue with the hash parameter binding.
Impact
An authenticated user with admin access to any project can:
- Delete link shares belonging to any other project in the system
- Disrupt collaboration by removing shared access links
- Link share IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial
Reproduction
- User A creates Project A and a link share on it (share ID = X)
- User B creates Project B (gaining admin access)
- User B calls
DELETE /api/v1/projects/{projectB_id}/shares/{X} - The permission check passes (User B is admin on Project B)
- The delete executes
WHERE id = X— deleting User A's link share
Recommended Fix
Change Delete at pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305 to:
_, err = s.Where("id = ? AND project_id = ?", share.ID, share.ProjectID).Delete(share)Also fix ReadOne at line 203 as defense in depth.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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