CVE-2026-34523: SillyTavern: Path Traversal allows file existence oracle
Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server's filesystem. By sending percent-encoded ../ sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn't exist, 403 means it exists).
Published Apr 1, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
sillytavern
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 1.16.0
- Fixed in
- 1.17.0
- Check
npm ls sillytavern
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server's filesystem. By sending percent-encoded ../ sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn't exist, 403 means it exists).
Details
The vulnerability is in createRouteHandler (src/users.js:947–963), which backs all user-data static file routes:
function createRouteHandler(directoryFn) {
return async (req, res) => {
const directory = directoryFn(req);
const filePath = decodeURIComponent(req.params[0]);
const exists = fs.existsSync(path.join(directory, filePath)); // no boundary check here
if (!exists) {
return res.sendStatus(404);
}
return res.sendFile(filePath, { root: directory });
};
}req.params[0] contains the raw (percent-encoded) wildcard from the URL. After decodeURIComponent, a request path like /characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira decodes to ../../Users/kirakira, and path.join resolves it outside the intended directory. res.sendFile correctly blocks the file from being served (the send module's root check returns 403), but fs.existsSync had already run, and the 403/404 distinction reveals the result.
Affected routes (they all use the same handler, so they're all affected):
/characters/*/user/files/*/assets/*/user/images/*/backgrounds/*/User%20Avatars/*
PoC
curl -o /dev/null -s -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:8000/characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira/something"Impact
While file contents cannot be read (the send module blocks actual delivery), anyone who can reach the SillyTavern HTTP port can check the existence of files on the host filesystem.
Resolution
The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0.
Credited to kirakira-dev.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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