CVE-2026-34729: phpMyFAQ: Stored XSS via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes()
Summary The sanitization pipeline for FAQ content is: 1. Filter::filterVar($input, FILTERSANITIZESPECIALCHARS) — encodes , ", ', & to HTML entities 2. htmlentitydecode($input, ENTQUOTES ENTHTML5) — decodes entities back to characters 3.
Published Apr 1, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.0
- Fixed in
- 4.1.1
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The sanitization pipeline for FAQ content is:
Filter::filterVar($input, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS)— encodes<,>,",',&to HTML entitieshtml_entity_decode($input, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5)— decodes entities back to charactersFilter::removeAttributes($input)— removes dangerous HTML attributes
The removeAttributes() regex at line 174 only matches attributes with double-quoted values:
preg_match_all(pattern: '/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', subject: $html, matches: $attributes);This regex does NOT match:
- Attributes with single quotes:
onerror='alert(1)' - Attributes without quotes:
onerror=alert(1)
An attacker can bypass sanitization by submitting FAQ content with unquoted or single-quoted event handler attributes.
Details
Affected File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Filter.php, line 174
Sanitization flow for FAQ question field:
FaqController::create() lines 110, 145-149:
$question = Filter::filterVar($data->question, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
// ...
->setQuestion(Filter::removeAttributes(html_entity_decode(
(string) $question,
ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,
encoding: 'UTF-8',
)))Template rendering: faq.twig line 36:
<h2 class="mb-4 border-bottom">{{ question | raw }}</h2>How the bypass works:
- Attacker submits: ``
- After
FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS:<img src=x onerror=alert(1)> - After
html_entity_decode(): `` preg_match_all('/[a-z]+=".+"/iU', ...)runs:- The regex requires
="..."(double quotes) onerror=alert(1)has NO quotes → NOT matchedsrc=xhas NO quotes → NOT matched- No attributes are found for removal
- Output: `` (XSS payload intact)
- Template renders with
|raw: JavaScript executes in browser
Why double-quoted attributes are (partially) protected:
For ``:
- The regex matches both
src="x"andonerror="alert(1)" srcis in$keep→ preservedonerroris NOT in$keep→ removed viastr_replace()- Output: `` (safe)
But this protection breaks with single quotes or no quotes.
PoC
Step 1: Create FAQ with XSS payload (requires authenticated admin):
curl -X POST 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/faq/create' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=admin_session' \
-d '{
"data": {
"pmf-csrf-token": "valid_csrf_token",
"question": "",
"answer": "Test answer",
"lang": "en",
"categories[]": 1,
"active": "yes",
"tags": "test",
"keywords": "test",
"author": "test",
"email": "[email protected]"
}
}'Step 2: XSS triggers on public FAQ page
Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) viewing the FAQ page triggers the XSS:
https://target.example.com/content/{categoryId}/{faqId}/{lang}/{slug}.htmlThe FAQ title is rendered with |raw in faq.twig line 36 without HtmlSanitizer processing (the processQuestion() method in FaqDisplayService only applies search highlighting, not cleanUpContent()).
Alternative payloads:
<svg onload=alert(1)>
Impact
- Public XSS: The XSS executes for ALL users viewing the FAQ page, not just admins.
- Session hijacking: Steal session cookies of all users viewing the FAQ.
- Phishing: Display fake login forms to steal credentials.
- Worm propagation: Self-replicating XSS that creates new FAQs with the same payload.
- Malware distribution: Redirect users to malicious sites.
Note: While planting the payload requires admin access, the XSS executes for all visitors (public-facing). This is not self-XSS.
Credited to ik0z.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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