CVE-2026-34785: Rack::Static prefix matching can expose unintended files under the static root
Summary Rack::Static determines whether a request should be served as a static file using a simple string prefix check. When configured with URL prefixes such as "/css", it matches any request path that begins with that string, including unrelated paths such as "/css-config.env" or "/css-backup.sql".
Published Apr 2, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.23
- Fixed in
- 2.2.23
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21
- Fixed in
- 3.1.21
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6
- Fixed in
- 3.2.6
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::Static determines whether a request should be served as a static file using a simple string prefix check. When configured with URL prefixes such as "/css", it matches any request path that begins with that string, including unrelated paths such as "/css-config.env" or "/css-backup.sql".
As a result, files under the static root whose names merely share the configured prefix may be served unintentionally, leading to information disclosure.
Details
Rack::Static#route_file performs static-route matching using logic equivalent to:
@urls.any? { |url| path.index(url) == 0 }This checks only whether the request path starts with the configured prefix string. It does not require a path segment boundary after the prefix.
For example, with:
use Rack::Static, urls: ["/css", "/js"], root: "public"the following path is matched as intended:
/css/style.cssbut these paths are also matched:
/css-config.env
/css-backup.sql
/csssecrets.ymlIf such files exist under the configured static root, Rack forwards the request to the file server and serves them as static content.
This means a configuration intended to expose only directory trees such as /css/... and /js/... may also expose sibling files whose names begin with those same strings.
Impact
An attacker can request files under the configured static root whose names share a configured URL prefix and obtain their contents.
In affected deployments, this may expose configuration files, secrets, backups, environment files, or other unintended static content located under the same root directory.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack that enforces a path boundary when matching configured static URL prefixes.
- Match only paths that are either exactly equal to the configured prefix or begin with
prefix + "/". - Avoid placing sensitive files under the
Rack::Staticroot directory. - Prefer static URL mappings that cannot overlap with sensitive filenames.
Credited to th4s1s, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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