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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2026-34786: Rack:: Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded paths

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh

Summary Rack::Static#applicablerules evaluates several headerrules types against the raw URL-encoded PATHINFO, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that headerrules were intended to apply.

Published Apr 2, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026

Affected packages

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 2.2.23
Fixed in
2.2.23
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21
Fixed in
3.1.21
Check
bundle info rack

rack

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6
Fixed in
3.2.6
Check
bundle info rack

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Rack::Static#applicable_rules evaluates several header_rules types against the raw URL-encoded PATH_INFO, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that header_rules were intended to apply.

In deployments that rely on Rack::Static to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path.

Details

Rack::Static#applicable_rules matches rule types such as :fonts, Array, and Regexp directly against the incoming PATH_INFO. For example:

when :fonts
  /\.(?:ttf|otf|eot|woff2|woff|svg)\z/.match?(path)
when Array
  /\.(#{rule.join('|')})\z/.match?(path)
when Regexp
  rule.match?(path)

These checks operate on the raw request path. If the request contains encoded characters such as %2E in place of ., the rule may fail to match even though the file path is later decoded and served successfully by the static file server.

For example, both of the following requests may resolve to the same file on disk:

/fonts/test.woff
/fonts/test%2Ewoff

but only the unencoded form may receive the headers configured through header_rules.

This creates a canonicalization mismatch between the path used for header policy decisions and the path ultimately used for file serving.

Impact

Applications that rely on Rack::Static header_rules to apply security-relevant headers to static files may be affected.

In affected deployments, an attacker can request an encoded variant of a static file path and receive the same file without the intended headers. Depending on how header_rules are used, this may bypass protections such as clickjacking defenses, content restrictions, or other response policies applied to static content.

The practical impact depends on the configured rules and the types of files being served. If header_rules are only used for non-security purposes such as caching, the issue may have limited security significance.

Mitigation

  • Update to a patched version of Rack that applies header_rules to a decoded path consistently with static file resolution.
  • Do not rely solely on Rack::Static header_rules for security-critical headers where encoded path variants may reach the application.
  • Prefer setting security headers at the reverse proxy or web server layer so they apply consistently to both encoded and unencoded path forms.
  • Normalize or reject encoded path variants for static content at the edge, where feasible.

Credited to harukioya, jeremyevans, ioquatix.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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