CVE-2026-34830: Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect
Summary Rack::Sendfile#mapaccelpath interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header.
Published Apr 2, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.2.23
- Fixed in
- 2.2.23
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21
- Fixed in
- 3.1.21
- Check
bundle info rack
rack
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6
- Fixed in
- 3.2.6
- Check
bundle info rack
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header.
In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.
Details
Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:
mapping.split(',').map(&:strip).each do |m|
internal, external = m.split('=', 2).map(&:strip)
new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
return new_path unless path == new_path
endHere, internal comes from the HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.
As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as .* or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:
X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txtcauses the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.
This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mapping path, which is described as a simple substitution. While application-supplied mappings may intentionally support regular expressions, header-supplied mappings should be treated as literal path prefixes.
The issue is only exploitable when untrusted X-Accel-Mapping headers can reach Rack. One realistic case is a reverse proxy configuration that intends to set X-Accel-Mapping itself, but fails to do so on some routes, allowing a client-supplied header to pass through unchanged.
Impact
Applications using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect may be affected if the backend accepts attacker-controlled X-Accel-Mapping headers.
In affected deployments, an attacker may be able to control the X-Accel-Redirect response header and cause nginx to serve files from internal locations that were not intended to be reachable through the application. This can lead to unauthorized file disclosure.
The practical impact depends on deployment architecture. If the proxy always strips or overwrites X-Accel-Mapping, or if the application uses explicit configured mappings instead of the request header, exploitability may be eliminated.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of Rack that treats header-supplied
X-Accel-Mappingvalues as literal strings rather than regular expressions. - Strip or overwrite inbound
X-Accel-Mappingheaders at the reverse proxy so client-supplied values never reach Rack. - Prefer explicit application-configured sendfile mappings instead of relying on request-header mappings.
- Review proxy sub-locations and inherited header settings to ensure
X-Accel-Mappingis consistently set on all backend routes.
Credited to mzfr, jeremyevans, ioquatix.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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