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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-34974: phpMyFAQ: SVG Sanitizer Bypass via HTML Entity Encoding Leads to Stored XSS and Privilege Escalation

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-5crx-pfhq-4hgg

Summary The regex-based SVG sanitizer in phpMyFAQ (SvgSanitizer.php) can be bypassed using HTML entity encoding in javascript: URLs within SVG attributes. Any user with editfaq permission can upload a malicious SVG that executes arbitrary JavaScript when viewed, enabling privilege escalation from editor to full admin takeover.

Published Apr 1, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026

Affected packages

thorsten/phpmyfaq

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 4.1.0
Fixed in
4.1.1
Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The regex-based SVG sanitizer in phpMyFAQ (SvgSanitizer.php) can be bypassed using HTML entity encoding in javascript: URLs within SVG ` attributes. Any user with edit_faq` permission can upload a malicious SVG that executes arbitrary JavaScript when viewed, enabling privilege escalation from editor to full admin takeover.

Details

The file phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php (introduced 2026-01-15) uses regex patterns to detect dangerous content in uploaded SVG files. The regex for javascript: URL detection is:

/href\s*=\s*["\']javascript:[^"\']*["\']/i

This pattern matches the literal string javascript: but fails when the URL is HTML entity encoded. For example, &#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58; decodes to javascript: in the browser, but does NOT match the regex. The isSafe() method returns true, so the SVG is accepted without sanitization.

Additionally, the DANGEROUS_ELEMENTS blocklist misses <animate>, <set>, and <use> elements which can also be used to execute JavaScript in SVG context.

Uploaded SVG files are served with Content-Type: image/svg+xml and no Content-Disposition: attachment header, so browsers render them inline and execute any JavaScript they contain.

The image upload endpoint (/admin/api/content/images) only requires the edit_faq permission — not full admin — so any editor-level user can upload malicious SVGs.

PoC

Basic XSS (confirmed working in Chrome 146 and Edge)

  1. Login to phpMyFAQ admin panel with any account that has edit_faq permission
  2. Navigate to Admin → Content → Add New FAQ
  3. In the TinyMCE editor, click the image upload button
  4. Upload this SVG file:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 200 200">
  
    <text x="20" y="50" font-size="16" fill="red">Click for XSS</text>
  
</svg>
  1. The SVG is uploaded to /content/user/images/<timestamp>_<filename>.svg
  2. Open the SVG URL directly in a browser
  3. Click the red text → alert(document.domain) executes

Privilege Escalation (Editor → Admin Takeover)

  1. As editor, upload this SVG:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 500 300">
  <rect width="500" height="300" fill="#f8f9fa"/>
  <text x="250" y="100" text-anchor="middle" font-size="22" fill="#333">📋 System Notice</text>
  r.json()).then(d=>document.title='pwned')">
    <rect x="150" y="170" width="200" height="50" rx="8" fill="#0d6efd"/>
    <text x="250" y="200" text-anchor="middle" font-size="16" fill="white">View Update →</text>
  
</svg>
  1. Send the SVG URL to an admin
  2. Admin opens URL, clicks "View Update →"
  3. JavaScript creates backdoor admin user backdoor:H4ck3d!
  4. Attacker logs in as backdoor with full admin privileges

Impact

This is a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability that enables privilege escalation. Any user with edit_faq permission (editor role) can upload a weaponized SVG file. When an admin views the SVG, arbitrary JavaScript executes in their browser on the phpMyFAQ origin, allowing the attacker to:

  • Create backdoor admin accounts via the admin API
  • Exfiltrate phpMyFAQ configuration (database credentials, API tokens)
  • Modify or delete FAQ content
  • Achieve full admin account takeover

The vulnerability affects all phpMyFAQ installations using the SvgSanitizer class (introduced 2026-01-15). Recommended fix: replace regex-based sanitization with a DOM-based allowlist approach, or serve SVG files with Content-Disposition: attachment to prevent inline rendering.

Credited to 0xmanhnv.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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