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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-35041: fast-jwt has a ReDoS when using RegExp in allowed* leading to CPU exhaustion during token verification

mediumCVSS 3.1 4.2GHSA-cjw9-ghj4-fwxf

⚠️ IMPORTANT CLARIFICATIONS ### Affected Configurations This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that: - Use RegExp objects (not strings) in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options - Configure patterns susceptible to catastrophic backtracking - Example: allowedAud: /^(a+)+X$/ ← VULNERABLE - Example: allowedAud: "api.company.com" ← SAFE ### Not Affected - Applications using…

Published Apr 9, 2026

Affected packages

fast-jwt

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
>= 5.0.0, <= 6.2.0
Fixed in
6.2.1
Check
npm ls fast-jwt

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

⚠️ IMPORTANT CLARIFICATIONS

Affected Configurations

This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that:

  • Use RegExp objects (not strings) in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options
  • Configure patterns susceptible to catastrophic backtracking
  • Example: allowedAud: /^(a+)+X$/ ← VULNERABLE
  • Example: allowedAud: "api.company.com" ← SAFE

Not Affected

  • Applications using string patterns for audience validation (most common)
  • Applications using safe RegExp patterns without nested quantifiers
  • Default fast-jwt configurations

Assessment Guide

To determine if you're affected:

  1. Check ifallowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce use RegExp objects (/pattern/ or new RegExp())
  2. If yes, review the pattern for nested quantifiers like (a+)+, (.*)*, etc.
  3. If no RegExp usage, you are NOT affected

------

<!--StartFragment-->Summary A denial-of-service condition exists in fast-jwt when the allowedAud verification option is configured using a regular expression. Because the aud claim is attacker-controlled and the library evaluates it against the supplied RegExp, a crafted JWT can trigger catastrophic backtracking in the JavaScript regex engine, resulting in significant CPU consumption during verification. This occurs with a validly signed JWT, making the issue exploitable in authenticated contexts such as: API gateways authentication middleware service-to-service communication OAuth / OIDC token validation pipelines Affected Component Library: fast-jwt Version tested: 6.1.0 Runtime: Node.js v24.13.1 Feature: claim validation using allowedAud: RegExp Impact CPU exhaustion / Denial of Service A crafted JWT causes verification to take multiple seconds per request due to catastrophic regex backtracking. Measured verification times

Input size (n) | Verification time -- | -- 24 | ~123 ms 28 | ~1.97 s 30 | ~7.85 s

This is sufficient to: block Node.js event loop threads degrade API throughput cause cascading service failures increase serverless execution costs saturate authentication infrastructure Root Cause The library allows regular expressions in claim validation: allowedAud: /^(a+)+X$/ The aud claim is attacker-controlled: aud = "a".repeat(n) + "Y" This creates catastrophic backtracking in the JavaScript regex engine. Verification time grows exponentially as input length increases. Exploitability Attack requires: a valid signed JWT (post-authentication context) attacker control over the aud claim a vulnerable regex configured by the application Common real-world scenarios shared HS secrets internal JWT issuance microservice authentication OAuth / OIDC custom audiences internal service tokens Proof of Concept Reproduction steps Install fast-jwt Configure verifier with a RegExp in allowedAud Send a valid signed JWT with adversarial aud Attached artifacts poc-suite-redos-fastjwt.js evidence-redos-fastjwt.json Observed behavior Verification CPU time increases from milliseconds to multiple seconds as input length grows. Security Classification CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Class: Authenticated Denial of Service Expected Behavior The library should prevent unbounded CPU work on attacker-controlled claims. Possible mitigations safe-regex validation maximum length enforcement for claims regex complexity limits documentation warning about ReDoS risks when using RegExp-based validation Notes Signature verification occurs before claim validation, therefore this is not a pre-authentication DoS. However, the vulnerability remains exploitable in authenticated or token-bearing contexts and can significantly impact production environments.<!--EndFragment-->

Credited to fasrm, SociableSteve.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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