CVE-2026-35469: SpdyStream: DOS on CRI
The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash. Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected: 1.
Published Apr 16, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/moby/spdystream
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.5.0
- Fixed in
- 0.5.1
- Check
go list -m github.com/moby/spdystream
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.
Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:
- SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit
numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload, triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.
- Header count --
parseHeaderValueBlockreads a 32-bit
numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an http.Header map of that size with no upper bound.
- Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are
read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with no validation.
Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is enough to exhaust process memory.
Impact
Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.
Affected versions
github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0
Fix
v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related hardening:
Core fixes:
- SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now
checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.
- Header count limit --
parseHeaderValueBlockenforces a maximum
number of headers per frame (default: 1000).
- Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value
lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB) before allocation.
- Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop
now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the same connection.
Additional hardening:
- Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify
that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the library from producing invalid frames.
Configurable limits:
- Callers can adjust the defaults using
NewConnectionWithOptionsor
the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options: WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and WithMaxHeaderCount.
References
- https://github.com/moby/spdystream/security/advisories/GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35469
- https://github.com/moby/spdystream/releases/tag/v0.5.1
- https://github.com/moby/spdystream/commit/ef6121f62c730110bf5ae604a865a8613bfb787f
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
