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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-35469: SpdyStream: DOS on CRI

highCVSS 4.0 8.7GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2

The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash. Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected: 1.

Published Apr 16, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/moby/spdystream

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 0.5.0
Fixed in
0.5.1
Check
go list -m github.com/moby/spdystream

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.

Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:

  1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit

numSettings from the payload and allocates a slice of that size without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker can set numSettings to a value far exceeding the actual payload, triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.

  1. Header count -- parseHeaderValueBlock reads a 32-bit

numHeaders from the decompressed header block and allocates an http.Header map of that size with no upper bound.

  1. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are

read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with no validation.

Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is enough to exhaust process memory.

Impact

Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service.

Affected versions

github.com/moby/spdystream <= v0.5.0

Fix

v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related hardening:

Core fixes:

  • SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now

checks that numSettings is consistent with the declared frame length (numSettings <= (length-4)/8) before allocating.

  • Header count limit -- parseHeaderValueBlock enforces a maximum

number of headers per frame (default: 1000).

  • Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value

lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB) before allocation.

  • Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop

now closes the underlying net.Conn when it encounters an InvalidControlFrame error, preventing further exploitation on the same connection.

Additional hardening:

  • Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify

that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the library from producing invalid frames.

Configurable limits:

  • Callers can adjust the defaults using NewConnectionWithOptions or

the lower-level spdy.NewFramerWithOptions with functional options: WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize, WithMaxHeaderFieldSize, and WithMaxHeaderCount.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology