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AI agent vulnerability · OpenClaw

CVE-2026-35664: OpenClaw: Feishu Raw Card Send Surface Can Mint Legacy Card Callbacks That Bypass DM Pairing

mediumGHSA-77w2-crqv-cmv3

In OpenClaw 2026.3.24 and earlier, a Feishu card sent with raw button values such as {"command": "/new"} created legacy callbacks that skip DM pairing. An unpaired recipient could then reach callback handling. The package data lists 2026.3.28 as the patched version.

Published Mar 29, 2026 · Updated Apr 10, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026

What an attacker can do

Feishu cards can carry buttons whose value tells OpenClaw what to do when pressed. The current design wraps that value in a structured interaction envelope made by createFeishuCardInteractionEnvelope, and the callback stays on the normal paired path. The send surface also accepted raw cards, where a button value held a plain command or text string and had no version marker.

Those legacy payloads were handled by a path that did not enforce DM pairing. A card sent with such a button handed an unpaired recipient a working control, and pressing it reached callback handling and could run a command like /new in a session they were never paired with (CWE-288, CWE-863).

The attacker has to get a raw card sent, which means access to the raw card send surface, for instance through an agent tool or another sender that can pass card JSON. Then the recipient presses the button. The advisory gives no CVSS score and describes no code execution. The effect is commands run under the bot's session from someone who failed pairing.

Who is affected

openclaw 2026.3.24 and earlier, with the Feishu extension enabled and DM pairing in use. Setups where nothing can send a raw card with command buttons carry less risk. Check the version:

npm ls openclaw

openclaw

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 2026.3.24
Fixed in
2026.3.28
Check
npm ls openclaw

How to fix it

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.3.28:

npm install [email protected]

The advisory body says 2026.3.25 is the first patched version; the package data says 2026.3.28. Use that or newer. Commit 81c45976db53 adds containsLegacyFeishuCardCommandValue in extensions/feishu/src/channel.ts. The send path now throws "Feishu card buttons that trigger text or commands must use structured interaction envelopes" before sending. Any integration that sends raw command buttons must switch to structured envelopes. Select controls are not affected.

How to tell if you were hit

Search your agent or integration code for Feishu card JSON where a button value contains a bare command or text key. Review Feishu send logs for cards with such buttons, and check for unexpected commands or new sessions started by users who never completed pairing. After the upgrade, a rejected send shows the structured interaction envelopes error.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Feishu Raw card Send Surface Can Mint Legacy Card Callbacks That Bypass DM Pairing

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.24
  • First patched version: 2026.3.25
  • Latest published npm version at verification time: 2026.3.24

Details

Feishu raw card sends could previously mint legacy callback payloads that bypassed DM pairing and let unpaired recipients reach callback handling. Commit 81c45976db532324b5a0918a70decc19520dc354 rejects legacy raw-card command payloads so callbacks stay on the normal paired path.

Verified vulnerable on tag v2026.3.24 and fixed on main by commit 81c45976db532324b5a0918a70decc19520dc354.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 81c45976db532324b5a0918a70decc19520dc354

Credited to zpbrent.

Questions

What is a legacy raw-card payload?

It is a button whose value object carries a command or text string directly and has no interaction version marker, instead of a structured envelope.

Does the fix block select menus too?

No. The guard checks only controls with the button tag. A select_static control with a text metadata value is still allowed.

Does the attacker need to be paired?

No, that is the point of the bypass. The recipient is unpaired. The attacker does need a way to cause a raw card to be sent.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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