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Open-source package vulnerability · npm

CVE-2026-39859: LiquidJS: `renderFile()` / `parseFile()` bypass configured `root` and allow arbitrary file read

mediumCVSS 4.0 6.3GHSA-v273-448j-v4qj

liquidjs 10.25.0 documents root as constraining filenames passed to renderFile() and parseFile(), but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary. The published npm package [email protected] on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A Liquid instance configured with an empty temporary directory as root still returned the contents of /etc/hosts when renderFile('/etc/hosts') was called.

Published Apr 8, 2026 · Updated Apr 9, 2026

Affected packages

liquidjs

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 10.25.4
Fixed in
10.25.5
Check
npm ls liquidjs

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

liquidjs 10.25.0 documents root as constraining filenames passed to renderFile() and parseFile(), but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary.

The published npm package [email protected] on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A Liquid instance configured with an empty temporary directory as root still returned the contents of /etc/hosts when renderFile('/etc/hosts') was called. I have not exhaustively checked older releases yet; 10.25.0 is the latest tested version.

Root cause:

  • src/parser/parser.ts:83-85 calls loader.lookup(file, LookupType.Root, ...) and then reads the returned file.
  • src/fs/loader.ts:38 passes type !== LookupType.Root into candidates().
  • For LookupType.Root, enforceRoot is false, so src/fs/loader.ts:47-66 accepts resolved absolute paths and fallback results without any contains() check.

This appears adjacent to the March 10, 2026 fix for CVE-2026-30952, which hardened include / render / layout but not the top-level file-loading APIs.

Proof of concept:

const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');

const safeRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'liquidjs-safe-root-'));
const engine = new Liquid({ root: [safeRoot], extname: '.liquid' });

engine.renderFile('/etc/hosts').then(console.log);

Expected result: a path outside root should be rejected. Actual result: /etc/hosts is rendered successfully.

Impact: any application that treats root as a sandbox boundary and forwards attacker-controlled template names into renderFile() or parseFile() can disclose arbitrary local files readable by the server process.

Suggested fix: apply the same containment checks used for partial/layout lookups to LookupType.Root, and reject absolute or fallback paths unless they remain within an allowed root. A regression test should verify that renderFile('/etc/hosts') fails when root points to an unrelated directory.

Credited to ryu7eroo.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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