CVE-2026-40103: Vikunja: Scoped API tokens with projects.background permission can delete project backgrounds
Summary Vikunja's scoped API token enforcement for custom project background routes is method-confused. A token with only projects.background can successfully delete a project background, while a token with only projects.backgrounddelete is rejected. This is a scoped-token authorization bypass. Details I verified this locally on commit c5450fb55f5192508638cbb3a6956438452a712e.
Published Apr 10, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.3.0
- Fixed in
- 2.3.0
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Vikunja's scoped API token enforcement for custom project background routes is method-confused. A token with only projects.background can successfully delete a project background, while a token with only projects.background_delete is rejected.
This is a scoped-token authorization bypass.
Details
I verified this locally on commit c5450fb55f5192508638cbb3a6956438452a712e.
Relevant code paths:
pkg/models/api_routes.gopkg/routes/routes.gopkg/modules/background/handler/background.go
Route registration exposes separate permissions for the same path:
GET /api/v1/projects/:project/background->projects.backgroundDELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/background->projects.background_delete
At enforcement time, CanDoAPIRoute() falls back to the parent group and reconstructs the child permission from the path segments only. For the DELETE request, that becomes background, so the matcher accepts any token containing projects.background without re-checking the HTTP method or matching the stored route detail.
This matters because RemoveProjectBackground() is a real destructive operation:
- It checks project update rights.
- It deletes the background file if present.
- It clears the project's
BackgroundFileID.
PoC
- Log in as a user who can update a project that already has a background.
- Create an API token with only:
{"projects":["background"]} - Send:
DELETE /api/v1/projects/<project_id>/backgroundAuthorization: Bearer <token> - Observe that the request succeeds and the project background is removed.
For comparison:
- Create an API token with only:
{"projects":["background_delete"]} - Repeat the same DELETE request.
- Observe that the request is rejected with
401 Unauthorized.
I confirmed this locally with three validations:
/api/v1/routesadvertises bothbackgroundandbackground_delete.- The matcher unit test proves
CanDoAPIRoute()accepts DELETE forbackground. - The webtest proves a real API token with only
backgroundsuccessfully deletes the background.
Impact
Scoped API tokens can exceed their intended capability. A token intended for project background access can delete project backgrounds, which weakens the trust model for automation and third-party integrations that rely on narrowly scoped tokens.
The attacker needs a valid API token created by a user who has update rights on the target project, but the token itself only needs the weaker projects.background permission.
Credited to alecclyde.
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2584
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/6a0f39b252a81fa4b19dc56dc889183acc9225ae
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.3.0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40103
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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