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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-40923: Tekton Pipelines: VolumeMount path restriction bypass via missing filepath.Clean in /tekton/ check

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858

Summary A validation bypass in the VolumeMount path restriction allows mounting volumes under restricted /tekton/ internal paths by using .. path traversal components. The restriction check uses strings.HasPrefix without filepath.Clean, so a path like /tekton/home/../results passes validation but resolves to /tekton/results at runtime.

Published Apr 21, 2026 · Updated May 22, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.10.0, < 1.11.1
Fixed in
1.11.1
Check
go list -m github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.7.0, < 1.9.3
Fixed in
1.9.3
Check
go list -m github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.4.0, < 1.6.2
Fixed in
1.6.2
Check
go list -m github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.2.0, < 1.3.4
Fixed in
1.3.4
Check
go list -m github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.0.0, < 1.0.2
Fixed in
1.0.2
Check
go list -m github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A validation bypass in the VolumeMount path restriction allows mounting volumes under restricted /tekton/ internal paths by using .. path traversal components. The restriction check uses strings.HasPrefix without filepath.Clean, so a path like /tekton/home/../results passes validation but resolves to /tekton/results at runtime.

Details

Tekton Pipelines restricts VolumeMount paths under /tekton/ (except /tekton/home) to prevent users from interfering with internal execution state. The validation at pkg/apis/pipeline/v1/container_validation.go checks mount paths using strings.HasPrefix without normalizing the path first:

if strings.HasPrefix(vm.MountPath, "/tekton/") &&
    !strings.HasPrefix(vm.MountPath, "/tekton/home") {
    // reject
}

Because /tekton/home is an allowed prefix, a path like /tekton/home/../results passes both checks. At runtime, the container runtime resolves .. and the actual mount point becomes /tekton/results.

The same pattern exists in pkg/apis/pipeline/v1beta1/task_validation.go.

Impact

An authenticated user with Task or TaskRun creation permissions can mount volumes over internal Tekton paths, potentially:

  • Writing fake task results that downstream pipelines trust
  • Reading or modifying step scripts before execution
  • Interfering with entrypoint coordination state

Patches

_(to be filled: fixed in versions X.Y.Z)_

Workarounds

  • Use admission controllers (OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) to validate that VolumeMount paths do not contain .. components.
  • In multi-tenant setups, restrict who can create Task and TaskRun resources via RBAC.

Affected Versions

All versions through v1.10.0 (both v1 and v1beta1 APIs).

Acknowledgments

This vulnerability was reported by @kodareef5.

Credited to kodareef5, vdemeester, aThorp96, waveywaves.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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