CVE-2026-41059: OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex
Impact A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of skipauthroutes or the legacy skipauthregex Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as ^/foo/./bar$ causing potential exposure of /foo/secret Protected upstream applications that interpret # as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the…
Published Apr 15, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 7.5.0, < 7.15.2
- Fixed in
- 7.15.2
- Check
go list -m github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
- Use of
skip_auth_routesor the legacyskip_auth_regex* Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as^/foo/.*/bar$causing potential exposure of/foo/secret* Protected upstream applications that interpret#as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path
In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form %23, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource.
Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, ARE NOT affected.
Patches
A fix has been implemented to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions.
Released as part of v7.15.2
Workarounds
Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments.
Recommended mitigations:
- Replace broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods
- Reject requests whose path contains
%23or#at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level - Avoid placing sensitive application paths behind broad
skip_auth_routesrules
Credited to rootxharsh.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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