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AI agent vulnerability · OpenClaw

CVE-2026-41299: OpenClaw: Gateway chat.send ACP-only provenance guard could be bypassed by client identity spoofing

highGHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f

In OpenClaw up to 2026.3.24, the gateway's chat.send method decided who may set reserved provenance fields from client identity declared in the WebSocket handshake. A normal authenticated operator could pose as the ACP bridge and inject those fields. Fixed in 2026.3.28, which requires admin scope.

Published Mar 31, 2026 · Updated Apr 20, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026

What an attacker can do

chat.send accepts two reserved fields, systemInputProvenance and systemProvenanceReceipt, meant only for the ACP bridge. The gate in src/gateway/server-methods/chat.ts used isAcpBridgeClient(client), which reads client metadata the client itself sends at connect time. Any operator client could claim to be the ACP bridge and pass the gate.

The attacker needs a valid operator connection with ordinary write rights. With the spoofed label they can attach system-level provenance to messages. Provenance tells the agent and the audit trail where an input came from, so forged values can make operator-written text look system-originated, or confuse tracking of who sent what. The advisory does not describe code execution or data theft. It is a trust-boundary break, rated high with no CVSS score in the data.

Who is affected

npm package openclaw, versions up to and including 2026.3.24. All gateways that accept operator clients are in scope, since the check relied on handshake metadata. Check the version:

npm ls openclaw

openclaw

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 2026.3.24
Fixed in
2026.3.28
Check
npm ls openclaw

How to fix it

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.3.28 or later:

npm install [email protected]

Commit 4b9542716c replaces the identity check with canInjectSystemProvenance, which requires operator.admin in the connection's verified scopes. Rejected calls now return the error system provenance fields require admin scope. The sources list no workaround.

How to tell if you were hit

Search gateway logs for chat.send requests that include systemInputProvenance or systemProvenanceReceipt from clients that do not hold admin scope. On patched versions, such attempts fail with system provenance fields require admin scope. Check which clients identify themselves as the ACP bridge and compare with your real bridge.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

ACP-only provenance fields in chat.send were gated by self-declared client metadata from the WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state.

Impact

A normal authenticated operator client could spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge.

Affected Component

src/gateway/server-methods/chat.ts, src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts

Fixed Versions

  • Affected: <= 2026.3.24
  • Patched: >= 2026.3.28
  • Latest stable 2026.3.28 contains the fix.

Fix

Fixed by commit 4b9542716c (Gateway: require verified scope for chat provenance).

Credited to zpbrent.

Questions

Who can exploit CVE-2026-41299?

A normal authenticated operator client. It spoofs the ACP identity label in the WebSocket handshake and then sends the reserved provenance fields.

What does the fix check instead?

The verified connection scope. Only a client with operator.admin can inject system provenance, whether or not it claims to be the ACP bridge.

Which version is patched?

openclaw 2026.3.28. Versions up to and including 2026.3.24 are affected.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

More OpenClaw vulnerabilities

All OpenClaw entries