CVE-2026-41301: OpenClaw: Forged Nostr DMs could create pairing state before signature verification
OpenClaw 2026.3.22 up to but not including 2026.3.31 issued pairing challenges for Nostr DMs before checking the event signature. An unauthenticated sender could create pending pairing entries with forged messages and use up shared pairing capacity. It does not give decryption or pairing approval. Fixed in 2026.3.31.
Published Apr 7, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026 · Analysis Oct 30, 2026
What an attacker can do
On the Nostr channel, the DM ingress path created a pending pairing entry and attempted a pairing reply before it verified the event's signature (CWE-347). Signature rejection came afterward, so a forged DM had already caused the side effects.
The attacker needs no account. They send forged Nostr DMs to the target's identity through relays. Each one can add a pending pairing entry and trigger a reply attempt, which also causes bounded relay and logging work. The pairing capacity is shared, so enough forged messages can crowd out real pairing requests. The CVSS 3.1 vector rates only low availability impact.
The maintainers state that the issue did not grant message decryption, pairing approval, or a broader authorization bypass. Only installations with the Nostr channel configured are exposed.
Who is affected
The openclaw npm package from 2026.3.22 up to but not including 2026.3.31. Earlier versions than 2026.3.22 are outside the stated range. Only setups using the Nostr channel are exposed.
npm ls -g openclaw
openclaw --versionopenclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 2026.3.22, < 2026.3.31
- Fixed in
- 2026.3.31
- Check
npm ls openclaw
How to fix it
Upgrade to 2026.3.31 or later. The advisory notes that the current release when written, 2026.4.1, also contains the fix.
npm install -g openclaw@latestThe fix is commit 4ee7421, which verifies inbound DM signatures before pairing replies. No workaround is given. If you cannot upgrade, you can disable the Nostr channel.
How to tell if you were hit
Look at pending pairing entries for the Nostr channel that you did not initiate, particularly many from unfamiliar public keys. Check OpenClaw logs for bursts of pairing-reply attempts followed by signature rejections. Watch relay traffic for repeated DMs aimed at your identity.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Before OpenClaw 2026.3.31, the Nostr DM ingress path could issue pairing challenges before validating the event signature. A forged DM could create a pending pairing entry and trigger a pairing-reply attempt before signature rejection.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote sender could consume shared pairing capacity and trigger bounded relay/logging work on the Nostr channel. This issue did not grant message decryption, pairing approval, or broader authorization bypass.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.3.22, < 2026.3.31 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.31 - Latest published npm version:
2026.4.1
Fix Commit(s)
4ee742174f36b5445703e3b1ef2fbd6ae6700fa4— verify inbound DM signatures before pairing replies
Release Process Note
The fix shipped in OpenClaw 2026.3.31 on March 31, 2026. The current published npm release 2026.4.1 from April 1, 2026 also contains the fix.
Thanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.
Credited to smaeljaish771, KeenSecurityLab.
Questions
- Which OpenClaw versions are affected by CVE-2026-41301?
2026.3.22 up to but not including 2026.3.31. The fix is in 2026.3.31 and later.
- Can a forged DM approve a pairing?
No. The maintainers say it did not grant pairing approval, message decryption or a broader authorization bypass.
- What is the actual harm?
Forged DMs could fill shared pairing capacity and trigger bounded relay and logging work, which can crowd out real requests.
- Is it exploited in the wild?
No source says so. The EPSS score is 0.0025.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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